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BOARD DIVERSITY BY TERM LIMITS?
Darren Rosenblum* & Yaron Nili**
Four-fifths of the corporate board seats in the United States are held by men and a shocking number of
companies lack any female representation on their boards. While institutional investors have pushed these
companies for change, California took a more aggressive step andfollo wed severalEuropean countries by
mandating a quota for board representation. Heated argument has ensued over what diversity we should
prioritige and what mechanisms should be used to promote diversity. Yet could these challenges be avoided
altogether through the use of term limits?
This Article is the first academic inquiry exploring the connection between term limits and the sex diver-
srfication of the corporate hoard. Drawing upon quantitative data on director turnover in the S&P 1500
and qualitative data on S&P 500 firms with term kmits, our research shows that firms experiencing
higher board turnover have more sex diversity. We argue that term limits, a mechanism that increases
turnover, may correlate with improved sex diversity on boards. Ourfindings suggest that promoting term
limits in the United States offers a market-based mechanism that could avert this polari.Zed diversity
debate.
INTRODUCTION
At the time the #MeToo movement' roiled the control of the founders of
The Weinstein Company and Wynn Resorts, the boards of those companies
were nearly all male, with the exception of one woman sitting on Wynn's
board.2 Both firms faltered-one to bankruptcy-upon revelations of sexual
* Professor at Elizabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. The Authors would like to thank
Kristyn Francese, Megan Edwards, Katie Gresham, Rebecca Hart, Luke Holden, Alyssa Katz, Chris Krew-
son, Brian Looser, Lucas Mathieu, Primrose Zhivanashe, and Justin Top for valuable research assistance.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. Support for this research was
provided by the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Graduate Education at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison with funding from the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.
1. The #MeToo movement deals with sexual violence and makes sure the most marginalized survivors
have access to resources. This movement is more than just a hashtag-it is the start of a longer conversation
about sexual violence, a space for community healing, and an opportunity for people to voice their experi-
ences. Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time's Up Founders Explain the Derence Between the 2 Movements - And How
They're Ake, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018, 5:21 PM), http://time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-the-
metoo-and-times-up-movements/; see also, Abigail Hess, Why Steve Wynn's Reignation May Be #MeToo's Most
Significant Milestone Yet, CNBC (Feb. 7, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/07/steve-wynns-
exit-may-be-metoos-most-significant-milestone-yet.html.
2. At the time, Wynn's board consisted of nine men and one woman: John J. Hagenbuch, Dr. Ray R.
Irani, Admiral Jay L. Johnson, Robert J. Miller, Ambassador Clark T. Randt Jr., Alvin V. Shoemaker, J. Ed-
ward Virtue, D. Boone Wayson, Stephen A. Wynn, and Patricia Mulroy. Wynn Resorts, Ltd., 2017 Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 4-9 (Mar. 10, 2017); Erik Pederson, Two More Weinstein Company Board Members
QuitAmidHarvy Weinstein Scandal, DEADLINE (Oct. 6,2017, 6:40 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
19/business/weinstein-company-bankruptcy.html.
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harassment by their founder-CEOs.3 Similarly, at the time of its fuel economy
scandal, Volkswagen had an all-male management board and counted only four
women among its twenty-person supervisory board, 4 one of whom was the wife
and former nanny of the supervisory board chairman.5
Did the board demographics of Weinstein, Wynn, and Volkswagen play a
role in the scandals that ensued? Given the domination of these boards by men
with long-standing ties, it seems likely.6 In the United States, senior white men
dominate board rooms, and they do so for a very long time. The average inde-
pendent director on an S&P 500 board is a 63.1-year-old white male and will
serve for nearly a decade (and often much longer).7 In 2017, board turnover
remained shockingly low with an average of just 0.81 new directors per S&P
500 board.8 Such dominance by a homogeneous group constitutes a textbook
recipe for groupthink.
3. Brooks Barnes, Weinstein Company FilesforBankruptcy and Revokes Nondisclosure Agreements, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/business/weinstein-company-bankruptcy.html;
Christopher Palmeri, Wynn Resorts Tumbles as Founder Accused ofPattem ofHarassment, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan.
26, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-26/wynn-resorts-tumbles-on-
steve-wynn-sexual-harassment-report (discussing how Wynn Resorts Ltd. shares sank over 8% following the
reports that Steve Wynn sexually harassed many women).
4. VOLKSWAGEN, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF MGMT. AND THEIR APPOINTMENTS (2012),
https://annualreport2Ol2.volkswagenag.com/corporategovernance/executivebodies/boardofmanagement.
html. The 2015 Volkswagen scandal revealed that up to 11 million cars worldwide were loaded with illegal
software that falsified emissions data. Hiroko Tabuchi & Jack Ewing, Volkswagen to Pay $14.7 Bilon to Settle
Diesel Claims in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/business/
volkswagen-settlement-diesel-scandal.html.
5. James B. Stewart, Problems at Volkswagen Start in the Boardrvom, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/business/intenational/problems-at-volkswagen-start-in-the-
boardroom.html. With the two-tier board structure typical of the German system, it is unusual that
Volkswagen's malfeasance went without notice; however, the supervisory board was composed of outsiders,
many of whom were part of the controlling families and other related individuals. Id. Professor Charles M.
Elson noted that Volkswagen's governance was a breeding ground for scandal," and "[i]t was an accident
waiting to happen." Id The firm's peculiar "hybrid of family control, government ownership and labor influ-
ence" played a role in the scandal. Id. In 2012, Ferdinand Piech, head of the company's supervisory board,
managed to get his admittedly unqualified wife, a former kindergarten teacher, a position on the board. Id
The supervisory boardroom is described, by Professor Elson, as "an echo chamber": a place where "[o]utside
views rarely penetrate." Id Some blame the increased emphasis on labor in the firm's decisions, which favored
employment over long-term prospects. See Chris Bryant & Richard Milne, Volkswagen's UniquelyAuful' Go-
ernance at Fault in Emissions Scandal, CNBC (Oct 4, 2015, 7:48 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/04/
volkswagens-uniquely-awful-governance-at-fault-in-emissions-scandal.html; see also Chris Bryant, Ursula Piech
joins VWSupervisoy Board, FIN. TIMES (April 19, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/3d118e86-8a52-1lel-
a0c8-00144feab49a.
6. Half of Wynn's board of directors had served in their positions for more than ten years. See Wynn
Resorts, Ltd., 2017 Proxy Statement, supra note 2, at 4-7; see also Stewart, supra note 5; Shawn Tully, How a
Handful ofBillonaires Kept Their Friend Harry Weinstein in Power, FORTUNE (Nov. 19, 2017), https://fortune.
com/2017/11/19/weinstein-scandal-board-battles/.
7. SPENCER STUART, 2017 SPENCER STUART U.S. BOARD INDEX 5,18 (2017), https://www.spencer
stuart.com/-/media/ssbi2Ol7/ssbi_2017_final.pdf [hereinafter 2017 BOARD INDEX].
8. Id at 2.
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Diversity may provide a tailored remedy. Diversity fosters decision-making
which involves a more careful analysis.9 Groups without diversity consistently
make weaker decisions than those made by groups with experiential diversity.10
Diverse boards may also more effectively avoid or manage scandalous govern-
ance failures."
The lack of diversity on boards has not gone unnoticed. Firms increasingly
allocate substantial resources to diversify their leadership as they face pressure
from investors and governments.1 2 Ever since Norway adopted quotas for sex
diversity over a decade ago, a slew of countries have joined its ranks and begun
mandating board inclusion. 13 Even in the quota-resistant United States,1 4 Cali-
fornia responded in 2018 by requiring all publicly traded companies to include
at least one woman on the board of directors by the end of 2019 and increasing
this mandate to at least two women for five-member boards and three women
for six-member and larger boards by August 2021.15 California may have started
9. Lisa H. Nicholson, Making In-Roads to Corporate General Counsel Positions.- It's Only a Matter of Time?, 65
MD. L. REV. 625, 637 (2006) (explaining how homogenous groups can "limit [their] discussions . .. without
surveying the full range of alternatives"); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J. L. BUS. &
FIN. 85, 99 (2000) (explaining that diversifying boards may prevent groupthink, mitigate a board's tendency
to conform, and promote board scrutiny of decision-making).
10. See Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: In.ghts into Corporate Governance
After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 930 (2015); see also SCoTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: How
THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMs, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 132-74 (2007)
(examining the power of collective wisdom and suggesting that diversity, rather than individuality, contributes
to superior outcomes for group decision-making).
11. See PAGE, supra note 10, at 132-74.
12. Michele E. A. Jayne & Robert L. Dipboye, Iveraging Diversity to Improve Business Performance: Research
Findings and Recommendations for OTganigations, 43 HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. 409, 409 (2004); David A. Katz &
Laura A. McIntosh, Gender Diversity andBoard Quotas, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(July 27, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/27/gender-diversity-and-board-quotas/.
13. See Nicola Clark, Getting Women Into Boardrooms, by Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27,2010), http://www.ny
times.com/2010/01/28/world/europe/28iht-quota.html (discussing proposed legislation regarding quotas
across several European countries); Claire Cain Miller, Women on Boards: Where the U.S. Ranks, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/upshot/women-on-boards-where-the-us-ranks.
html; see also James Kanter, E.U. Considers Quotas for Women in Boardrooms, N.Y. TIM1ES (Mar. 4, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/business/global/eu-considers-quotas-for-women-in-boardrooms.
html (reporting on a 2012 gender quota proposal in the European Union).
14. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (holding that racial quotas
are unconstitutional as part of a college admissions policy).
15. Kim Elsesser, Cakefornia Mandates Women on Corporate Boards, but Do Quotas Work?, FORBES (Oct. 2,
2018, 5:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2018/10/02/california-mandates-women-on-
corporate-boards-but-do-quotas-work/#1b7bf7665866. Part of the resistance to quotas in the United States
focuses on the limitations on individual opportunity. Id. Another concern is the necessary use of the sex
binary to determine whether someone can or cannot join a board. Within the United States, the first state to
consider a quota, California, saw its bill proposed on January 3, 2018, requiring a quota for corporate boards.
Id. The bill proposed to add §§ 301.3 and 2115.5 to the Corporations Code, "which would require domestic
general [corporations] or foreign corporation[s] that [are] publicly held corporation[s,] ... whose principal
executive offices . .. are located in California, to have a minimum of one female, as defined, on its board of
directors" by December 31, 2019. S.B. 826, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). "The bill would increase
that required minimum number to 2 female directors [on or before December 31, 2021] if the corporation
has 5 [authorized] directors, or to 3 directors if the corporation has 6 or more [authorized] directors." Id.
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a larger movement towards quotas within the United States, as Illinois has
passed its own law encouraging board diversity and New Jersey may soon fol-
low suit.16
Yet while boards have become more diverse, such diversity rarely ap-
proaches critical mass:'7 79% of public corporations in California currently fail
the 2021 standards.' 8
Many Californian companies that were failing the Californian mandate at
the time of its passage stand out: Skechers, the third-largest U.S. footwear man-
ufacturer, has a nine-man, no-woman board. 9 TiVo also counts no women on
its board. Facebook and Apple will be noncompliant unless they each add a
woman to their boards by 2021,20 along with as many as 377 other firms. 21
Diversity mandates, however, confront substantial challenges: what kind of
diversity should we prioritize? How do we know that someone is diverse? What
mechanisms ensure diversity and at what cost? Perhaps most controversially,
how can we favor certain individuals over others based on identity in the fairest
manner possible?
While in other scholarly work we engage with arguments that explore why
regulators and firms should pursue diversity and inclusion,22 this Article reveals
"[Tmhe Secretary of State [would be required] to publish ... reports . .. documenting ... the number of cor-
porations in compliance with these provisions [and would be authorized] to impose fines for violations of
the bill." Id. The first violation would be a fine equal to the amount of the annual cash compensation for the
directors of the corporation, and the second or subsequent violation would be a fine equaling three times the
average annual cash compensation. Id. As of May 31, 2018, the bill passed with twenty-two votes for and
eleven votes against, making California the first state in the United States to have such a law. Id
16. Alexis Keenan, Cakfornia's New Female Board Member Mandate Could Be Re for a Constitutional Chal-
lenge, YAHOO FIN. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/californias-female-board-member-
mandate- 151 829527.html.
17. See generally MELISSA S. FISHER, WALL STREET WOMEN (2012). A group needs 35% minority rep-
resentation for the minority members to have say in its decision-making. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects
of Proportions on Group life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. Soc. 965, 966 (1977). See
Dan Marcec, Equilar Gender Diversity Index.Q3 2017, EQUILAR (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.equilar.com/re-
ports/52-gender-diversity-index-q3-2017.html (indicating that representation of women on Russell 3000
boards was steady at 16.2% from June to September of 2017, falling short of the desired 35/); see also 2018
GenderfDiversity Index Key Findings, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS 4 (2018), https://www.2020wob.com/sites/de-
fault/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2018_FINAL.pdf (explaining that for the 898 Gender Diversity Index
companies assessed, women held 22% of the board seats for 2018, not yet achieving 35%).
18. Tomas Pereira, Gender Quotas in Caiforia Boardrooms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.aw.harvard.edu/2018/08/29/gender-quotas-in-california-
boardrooms/.
19. Irina Ivanova, Neary 100 Cakfornia Companies Have No Women on Their Board ofDirectors, CBS NEWS
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nearly-100-california-companies-have-no-women-on-
board-of-directors/.
20. Id.
21. Analisa Barrett, How Many Cakfornia Companies Have to Add Women to Their Boards?, LINKEDIN
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-many-california-companies-have-add-women-boards
-annalisa-barrett/?published=t.
22. Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversio on Boards Benefit Firms?, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 429, 429
(2017).
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how companies can advance diversity without explicitly regulating diversity at
all.
What if some diversity-specifically sex diversity-could be achieved
merely by speeding up the merry-go-round of corporate board membership? If
governance suffers from stultified groupthink, nonidentitarian term limits may
be the perfect remedy. Limiting the service of directors on the board to a max-
imum term forces new arrivals, each of whom adds experiential diversity.
23 A
market-based mechanism like term limits could avoid the controversy sur-
rounding gender-classification policies, like a gender quota, entirely.
This Article focuses on term limits' ability to promote sex diversity within
boardrooms-as opposed to race, class, and other kinds of diversity-for two
reasons: (1) the plethora of public remedies for sex equality, and (2) the availa-
bility of data on board member composition by sex. The data available for our
study rely on the male-female binary and exclude other sexes.24 While this re-
stricts our analysis, we hope that our examination of sex diversity on boards
will spark work on other types of diversity.
Though term limits have proven controversial as a means of improving
governance, 25 they constitute a workable method to advance board diversity.
Scholars and advocates have recently begun to look toward term limits' poten-
tial for improving governance generally,26 and a small but diverse cohort of U.S.
firms have already adopted board term limits. 27 Most policies, however, have
23. See infra Part IV.
24. We use "sex" rather than "gender" because the discussion regarding board-member composition
mandates a binary distinction between men and women rather than a more fluid framework. "'Gender' and
'sex' have distinct meanings: 'gender' denotes identity and traits related to sex, including the 'masculine' and
the 'feminine."' Darren Rosenblum, 'Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendeed Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism,
6 MICH.J. GENDER & L. 499, 501 n.5 (2000). "Katherine Franke makes the distinction that '[s]ex is regarded
as a product of nature, while gender is understood as a function of culture."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake ofSex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation ofSexfrom Gender, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995)).
25. Some argue that term limits can threaten director performance and that board composition assess-
ments and evaluations are more likely to contribute to corporate performance than term limits. Robert C.
Pozen, The Trend Towards Board Term Limits Is Based on Faulty Lagic, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (June 1, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/0 6 /01/the-trend-towards-board-term-
limits-is-based-on-faulty-logic/. Additionally, because "experienced directors make positive a contribution to
[companies in the area of] strategic and monitoring decisions," implementing term limits may be a short-
sighted solution to independence issues. Ying Dou, Sidharth Sahgal & Emma Jincheng Zhang, Should Inde-
pendent Directors Have Term Limits? The Role ofExperience in Corporate Governance 1, 5 (U. New S. Wales, Working
Paper, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2089175.
26. Yaron Nili, The 'New Inders": Rethinking Independent Directors' Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 108-11
(2016). Yet, some argue that term limits can threaten director performance, and that "board composition
[assessments and evaluations] are more likely to contribute to corporate performance than . .. term limits."
Pozen, supra note 25; see also Na Li & Aida Sijamic Wahid, Director Tenure Diversity and Its Impact on Governance,
COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 13, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/1
3 /
director-tenure-diversity-and-its-impact-on-governance/ (proposing "to further explore the idea of... opti-
mal average board tenure").
27. Only 5% of the S&P 1500 firms have term limits. Jon Lukomnik, Board Refreshment Trends at S&P
1500 Firms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FiN. REG. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2017/02/09/board-refreshment-trends-at-sp-1500-firms/.
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some delay before forcing members to leave.28 This Article is the first academic
inquiry exploring how term limits may improve board diversification in addition
to any governance benefits, 29 potentially tilting the balance of the scales in favor
of term limits.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I frames our question-providing
context for term limits and their role with respect to corporate boards. Part II
makes the case for the utility of term limits, even in the face of some persuasive
counterarguments, to establish a theory of how turnover and, by extension,
term limits (which mandate turnover) might yield increased diversity. Part III
presents our novel empirical data, showing that higher board turnover does in
fact correlate with increased sex diversity. Within Part III, we describe our
quantitative data from the S&P 1500 companies for the years 2007-2015. We
also consider firms that faced a turnover "shock"-a large drop in tenure that
reflects significant refreshment.30 Part IV proposes a range of policy options
for firms and legislators to act on this research. Ultimately, we conclude that a
correlation exists between turnover and increased diversity and that turnover
may reflect corporate cultures or broader economic factors that incentivize
firms to change. Furthermore, while we cannot distinguish between turnover
and term limits, term limits inevitably lead to increased turnover. We conclude
that the correlation between term limits and gender diversity on corporate
boards proves so substantial that it demands closer study.
I. WHY TENURE MATTERS Now
Market disruptions such as the 2000 and 2008 crashes prompted height-
ened regulation and disclosure requirements through the passage of the Sar-
banes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts.3' Corporate boards bear much of this new
28. 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 19; see also Lukomnik, supra note 27.
29. In the popular press, reporters have asserted a link between term limits and diversity, but no fuller
exploration or research exists to our knowledge. See, e.g., Bob Ramsay, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards Won't
Happen Until We Limit Terms, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 5,2015), https://www.theglobeandmal.com/report-on-
business/rob-commentary/gender-diversity-on-corporate-boards-wont-happen-until-we-limit-terms/arti-
cle27612797/.
30. We use a few different terms in this Article when discussing term limits. "Term limits" are provi-
sions that require a director to leave the board after a specific number of years of service. "Tenure" is the
actual length of time that a board member serves. We can calculate term limits and tenure as to either average
levels of a board, a universe of companies, or specifically with regard to individuals. Importantly, board turn-
over interacts with board tenure. When a director leaves a board, their tenure is replaced by the new director's
tenure (which is zero) leading to a reduction in the board's average tenure. Yet, while shorter tenure may
suggest that there is higher turnover, to draw a direct inference presumes that the total number of board
members does not change. In fact, the average size of boards has remained practically the same over the last
ten years. 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 16.
31. See Nili, sepra note 26 (discussing the "legislative acts and listings standards [that] transformed the
voluntary shift in board composition into a mandatory one [and] increase[d the] responsibilities" of the board
to act as monitors). See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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regulatory and investor scrutiny.32 While the past decade saw board responsi-
bilities spike, tenure remains largely the same as before,33 leaving firms bereft
of the new perspectives that would ameliorate their governance. 34 As a result,
term-limit policies merit more traction in U.S. corporate governance. 35
This Part will examine term limits. The paucity of corporate-term-limits
literature led us to consider political term limits. In that context, refreshment
may empower or enfeeble the officials subject to the term limits. 36 In the cor-
porate context, a frank exploration of the political economy of the firm-its
interaction with the state, elites, and political and economic power generally-
clarifies how boards, dominated by incumbents, operate. This Part will describe
how term limits work and why U.S. states and firms should put them into prac-
tice.
A. What Term Limits Do
Shareholders elect board members to govern the firm. The board in turn
chooses the CEO of the firm.37 It is, therefore, the job of the board to scrutinize
and serve as a check on the company's executives or management. While exist-
ing U.S. regulations govern elements of board service, including the proportion
of employee board members to independent board members,38 no regulations
32. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers,
Directors, andAccountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 376 (1975) (discussing that the board of directors is the core
of modern corporate decision-making); Business Roundtable, Princples of Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH.
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 8, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/0 9 /08/
principles-of-corporate-governance (discussing the board of directors' "vital role [in] overseeing the com-
pany's management and business strategies to achieve long-term value creation'.
33. See Ana Dutra, A More Effective Board of Directors, HARV. Bus. REV. (Nov. 5, 2012),
https://hbr.org/2012/11 /a-more-effective-board-of-dire (explaining how "[t]he definition of board effec-
tiveness has shifted [as] a director now confronts ... complex oversight accountability" and "personal risk
and liability"); Lukomnik, supra note 27.
34. See Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 889 (explaining how firms improved governance
through the diversification of new perspectives).
35. See id. Only 27% of boards with a lead or presiding director impose term limits on the position,
according to Deloitte's 2016 Board Practices Report, with half these firms adopting a four-year term limit,
and a two-year term limit being the next common limit. Randi Morrison, Board Practires: Lead/Presiding Director
Term limits, SOC'Y FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 15,2017,9:23 AM), https://connect.societycorpgov.org/
blogs/randi-morrison/2017/05/15/board-practices-leadpresiding-director-term-limits. Data from the 2016
Spencer Stuart U.S. Board Index indicates "that 46% [of S&P firms] have no set term[, and olf those that do,
19% have a 1-year term, 6% have a 2-year term, and 4% have a 3-year term." Id. Additionally, "Legal &
General Investment Management re-issued its guidance on board refreshment[, which] indicat[es] that it will
vote against lead independent directors if they have been serving for 15 years or longer[, land other investors
have adopted [a] tenure proxy voting guideline[]." Id.
36. See Rainbow Murray, Quotasfor Men: Reframing Gender.Quotas as a Means of Improving Representation for
All, 108 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 520, 525 (2014) (describing that Mexican legislators are limited to serving two
consecutive terms, which "indicate[s] the potential for complete political renewal within a single election").
37. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
155 (2008) (detailing the role of the board monitoring management); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19
CARDOzo L. REV. 265, 269 (1997).
38. See Nili, smpra note 26, at 109.
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mandate term length; firms can, however, choose to impose term limits. Such
limits in the United States are both rare and inconsistent in their duration and
form.39 Elsewhere around the world, however, regulators implemented board
term limits in the hope that regularly refreshed boards may exercise more ob-
jective scrutiny over management."
Term limits take many forms. Some limits bar continued service by board
members entirely after a given period while others restrict a board's aggregate
tenure. Limits may apply to key committees, such as remuneration or oversight
committees, barring board members from serving on such committees after a
given period of service.4' Other requirements convert long-serving outside di-
rectors to insider status, commensurate with their reduced independence. 42
These distinct forms of tenure reduction tailor the continued presence of new
perspectives on boards. In addition, some firms have pursued "softer" limits
which count tenure negatively in retention decisions.
Only 5% of the S&P 500 companies explicitly limit terms for nonexecutive
directors. 43 These limits range from ten to twenty years: half are fifteen-year
limits, and an additional five use a twelve-year limit.44 Widespread disinterest
prevails: two-thirds of the S&P 500 companies report no limits and only 3%
report any interest in adopting limits.45 In the United States, directors must im-
pose retirement on themselves.46 In this regard, the United States sits outside
of this global norm of limiting tenure. Indeed, the commonplace nature of
lengthy terms on U.S. boards may undermine the efficacy of their oversight.47
39. Lukomnik, supra note 27.
40. See Dennis B. Veltrop et al., The Relationshs) Between Tenure and Outside Director Task Involvement A
Social Identity Perspective, 44 J. MGMT. 445, 446 (2018) ("Regulators in both European (e.g., the United King-
dom, Spain, the Netherlands) and non-European countries (e.g., India, Malaysia, Singapore), as well as various
corporate bodies in the United States (e.g., Calpers, the National Association of Corporate Directors), advo-
cate to limit outside director tenure." (footnote omitted)); Janet McFarland, Governance Guideines: Countries Set
Out Rules on Directors' Tenure, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/careers/management/board-games-2013/countries-set-out-rules-on-directors-tenure/arti-
clel5574442/.
41. Nili, supra note 26, at 152-54. For example, as suggested by Nih, the scope of board tenure can be
limited to audit and compensation committees to ensure director independence, or the length of tenure could
be (1) limited to the current average tenure, (2) predetermined by each company with shareholder approval,
or (3) limited by a "comply-or-explain rule," allowing companies to set limits but opt out by explaining why
the limit would not be beneficial in order to ensure director independence. Id.
42. See Lukomnik, supra note 27.
43. 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 5. This reflects an increase of more than 20% from 2016
when only nineteen companies had term limits; see SPENCER STUART, 2016 SPENCER STUART U.S. BOARD
INDEX 3 (2016), https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/pdf%/20files/research%20and%20insight%20
pdfs/spencer-stuart-us-board-index-2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 BOARD INDEX].
44. 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 19.
45. Id. at 5-6.
46. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLEs, 2012 BOARD OF DIRECTORs SURVEY 5 (2012),
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/31072332/2012-board-of-directors-survey-heidick-
struggles.
47. See Nili, supra note 26, at 101 (arguing that directors with "long[er] tenures and insider backgrounds
might . .. erode the true independence of the board").
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B. The Scholarly Debate Over Term Limits
As common as term limits may be in the world, U.S. critics fear a loss of
expertise. Supporters point to the need for independent and fresh perspectives
to balance the board's essential functions-monitoring and advising.48 As di-
rectors linger, they acquire expertise in the firm but also become entrenched.49
Entrenchment undermines the independence necessary to monitor manage-
ment without any conflict of interest.50 Long-term directors develop fixed cog-
nitive frameworks that diminish their capacity to evaluate senior management. 5 '
These frameworks may even lead to some complacency among long-term di-
rectors, jeopardizing their oversight duties.52
Firms have begun to replace traditional insiders with directors who appear
"independent" for regulatory purposes but who actually function as insiders.53
These "new insiders" acquire a structural bias that compromises their independ-
ent thinking.54 Such close-knit boards may experience greater trust and open-
ness but come up short on independence.5 5 These long-term directors may
48. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Sterling Huang & Gilles Hilary, Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance, 56J. ACCT.
RES. 1285, 1285 (2018) (finding evidence that long-tenured directors tend to be the most involved in the
middle period of tenure, having less experience at the beginning of their directorship and more entrenchment
at the end); Nikos Vafeas, Length ofBoard Tenure and Outside Director Independence, 30 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 1043,
1062 (2003) (concluding that directors with longer tenure are associated with greater committee participation
in the nominating and compensation committees but also associated with CEO entrenchment); Veltrop et
al., supra note 40, at 449.
50. See Nili, supra note 26, at 101; Vafeas, supra note 49, at 1043 (suggesting that board tenure could be
a determinant of the effectiveness and quality of board's monitoring capabilities); Li & Wahid, supra note 26;
see also Veltrop et al., supra note 40, at 447.
51. See Li & Wahid, supra note 26. While some studies indicate that longer tenure results in better
monitoring due to decreasing susceptibility to management influence, other studies indicate that longer tenure
leads to a higher commitment to the status quo and to entrenchment, resulting in weaker monitoring. Id.;
Nili, supra note 26, at 101 (arguing that longer tenures and insider backgrounds might erode board independ-
ence). Dennis Veltrop argues that director entrenchment means that directors are "unable to break estab-
lished cognitive patterns and are less likely to consider solution alternatives." Veltrop et al., supra note 40, at
446 (citation omitted); see also Vafeas, supra note 49.
52. Director Term Limits Come Up for Review, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, 2d Quarter 2008, at 18,
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/sites.udel.edu/dist/f/506/files/2012/1 1 /DB-Ray-Troubh-Term-
Linits-Cover-and-Article.pdf; see also Li & Wahid, supra note 26 (suggesting that socially integrated, not ten-
ure-diverse groups may take part in groupthink, become complacent, and foster "an inability to monitor firm
management in the board setting").
53. Nili, supra note 26, at 148-49.
54. Id. at 118. "Social ties to the upper management of [al corporation ... could threaten true inde-
pendence," and longer tenure can exacerbate the impact that these ties have on independence. Id. David Katz
similarly suggests that longer tenure could create too close of a relationship between board members and the
CEO. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Director Tenure Remains a Focus ofInvestors andActiists, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/01
/director-tenure-remains-a-focus-of-investors-and-activists/ (discussing comply-or-explain policies in firms).
55. Nili, supra note 26, at 118-20 ("[S]ocial science and corporate governance literature [indicate] that
a close-knit board can be beneficial for board performance, by increasing trust and openness between board
members.").
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wield influence that restrains new directors in the boardroom in their thinking
as well as with regard to incentives and social structures. 56
In the face of these challenges, term limits might ensure a non-compro-
mised independence. The test would surface in the crucial board-CEO rela-
tionship.5 7 When CEOs rise from within, a director with longer tenure will have
a preexisting social relationship with the new CEO.58 Even with an outsider
CEO, board members may feel beholden to the CEO they chose, leaving ten-
ured directors "less likely to stir the pot." 59 This proclivity toward groupthink
reflects how long-term directors may contribute less to the company. 60
Term limits correct many of these harms. They maintain the pool of insti-
tutional knowledge on boards but rotate members to ensure new perspectives
and independent thinking. 61 Monitoring of executive officers may improve-
possibly even leading to more reasonable compensation. 62 Unlike arguments
for including gender, race, or other identitarian diversities to the board, term
limits assume nothing about who the tenured diverse members are.63
56. Id. at 118-22. "As tenure increases, . . . social ties [can] grow stronger ... which exacerbates the
potential threat to independence." Id. at 118. Long tenures coupled with equity compensation run the risk of
jeopardizing independent action if that action could damage the value of the director's equity. Id at 121.
"[D]irectors might refrain from acting diligently ... when [that] action would have a negative impact on firm
value"; the disincentive to lower firm value increases the longer the director has served and the more equity
they accrue in the company. Id Director tenure and the increasingly close social ties to their peers can also
have a negative impact on independence due to the director-election process. Id. at 122. In some instances,
directors who face a lack of shareholder support can continue to hold their seat if their peers on the board
determine that they should. Id.
57. Id. at 124 (describing CEO tenure as generally "shorter than that of a director, [so] an argument
can be made that the more tenured directors are more independent vis-A-vis the CEO, and not the other way
around").
58. Id
59. Id. Another argument for the status quo with respect to director tenure is that if directors "lose
interest in [the] company[,] ... stop contributing, or start missing board meetings[, tlhey should be replaced
regardless of their tenure." Pozen, supra note 25. Although this solution would be ideal, it may not work in a
close-knit board of long-tenured members. As Nili noted, these directors rely on each other and management
for reelection, and even if the shareholders do not support one of them, their job can be saved by their peers.
Nil, supra note 26, at 122.
60. See Nili, supra note 26, at 124.
61. Li & Wahid, supra note 26.
62. Id. Steven Ramirez notes that heterogeneous working groups (as opposed to homogeneous groups)
"show greater inclination for critical thinking and are less likely to ... mindlessly conform to group" precon-
ceptions or, in other words, participate in "groupthink." Ramirez, supra note 9, at 99. Implementing tenure
diversity will encourage more heterogeneous working groups and combat groupthink tendencies.
63. See Li & Wahid, supra note 26. However, despite these benefits, "there is [currently] no evidence
that tenure diversity [leads to] better future market performance .... The findings are consistent with prior
studies, which find that increased monitoring may interfere with the board's advisory role." Id.
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Term limits certainly carry real costs. No formula exists for precisely when
reduced independence overwhelms the expertise that comes with a longer ten-
ure,64 and the cost-benefit analyses prove challenging in either direction.65
The arbitrary loss of well-qualified directors may undermine board perfor-
mance, 66 and experienced directors may retain the assertiveness to counterbal-
ance the CEO properly.67 One study suggests that experienced directors may
monitor strategy better.68 Another points to higher levels of commitment to the
company, as more experienced directors counterbalance CEO authority.69 Al-
leged benefits of longer-tenured board members include lower CEO pay, higher
CEO turnover, a lower likelihood of misreported earnings, and a higher likeli-
hood of making high-quality acquisitions. 70
Accordingly, proponents of the status quo argue that rather than coerce
change, the nominating committee should inventory the skills and experiences
that the firm requireS71 and assess objectively whether the board meets those
needs. 72 If not, change should happen regardless of tenure requirements.73 The
64. The first question is open for debate. Several studies have been done that indicate that director
tenure has a curvilinear (inverted "U" shape) effect on effectiveness, but effectiveness can be measured in
too many ways to pinpoint the perfect point at which a director is on the downfall. See Veltrop et al., sepra
note 40, at 457. The study conducted by Sterling Huang and Gilles Hilary demonstrates that board tenure
exhibits a "U"-shaped relation: "[D]irectors' on-the-job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at
which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers." See, e.g., Huang & Hilary, supra note 49,
at 1285.
65. See Li & Wahid, supra note 26.
66. See Dou, Sahgal & Zhang, supra note 25, at 31.
67. See Pozen, supra note 25 (discussing how a study conducted by economists at the University of
New South Wales indicated that "[c]ompanies with a higher proportion of experienced directors ... were
more likely to change chief executives when performance faltered" and "experienced directors were more
likely to attend board meetings and [more likely to] become members of board committees").
68. See generally Dou, Sahgal & Zhang, supra note 25.
69. Id. at 24 (indicating that director term limits would eliminate "a counterbalance to the CEO in the
board room"). Some arguments against term limits are that long-term directors have experience, are hard to
replace, and have a good sense of the company. Director Term Limits Come Up for Review, supra note 52, at 19;
Li & Wahid, supra note 26.
70. Dou, Sahgal & Zhang, supra note 25, at 4. To evaluate the contribution of experienced directors
to firms, an experienced director was defined as one with more than fifteen years of experience, and then the
proportion of these directors on the board was utilized as the "explanatory variable in regressions where firm
outcomes including CEO compensation, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, earnings restatements, ac-
quisition decisions, and acquisition performance were the dependent variables." Id at 2; see also Pozen, supra
note 25.
71. Director Term Limits Come Up for Review, supra note 52, at 20. Kenneth Daly provided insight that
term limits are the least popular method of refreshing board membership, as only 8.3% of respondents to a
2007 survey approved of term limits. Id.
72. Pozen, supra note 25. Assessments that "inventory [the] skills, experiences, and characteristics [that]
the company needs" should be made, and "the nominating committee should evaluate whether these needs
are being met by current board members or whether board composition should be adjusted." Id.
73. Director Term Limits Come Up for Review, supra note 52, at 24. Some critics doubt the effectiveness of
"trying to solve performance issues with term limits," favoring term limits as a means to get fresh talent rather
than as a means to deal with performance issues. Id.
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rigidity of term limits may skate over the firm's specific circumstances, and the
skills that a firm values and needs should determine board composition.74
However, the nominating committee itself may become entrenched. Natu-
rally occurring transitions-with a consistently rigorous and thorough nomi-
nating committee-would ideally ensure the board's independence. In reality,
this rarely happens.
For that reason, term limits and tenure diversity mandates prove necessary
to allow boards to balance longer-tenured directors with newness and actual
independence. While term limits may only offer a rough approximation of
which members should end their tenure on a board, they provide an effective
tool to remove board members75 and can improve the long-term health of a
firm. 76
Recent years have seen greater emphasis on director tenure as a key metric
of corporate governance. Shorter tenures signal good governance for company
evaluations and voting recommendations by proxy advisors.77 As a result, nearly
all boards hold turnover as a goal: 89% of respondents to a Spencer Stuart sur-
vey noted that firms encourage regular board refreshment.7 8 Despite this
avowed support, turnover has remained low (only 0.8 new directors were added
per board in 2017), and the average independent director tenure remains high
at 8.2 years.79
Though these counterarguments have perhaps led some market actors to
move more slowly, term limits have begun to spread more rapidly. In 2018, the
number of firms with term limits grew significantly-over 3 0 % more as com-
pared to 2017.80 Indeed, the increased attention to tenure as a governance factor
will continue to play a key role in the discourse regarding term limits.
74. Id at 20-21. A good-quality, long-tenured director could still add value, but this director may be
lost due to a rigidly imposed limit. Id.
75. Id at 23. Regarding board evaluations, firms can be reluctant "to pull the trigger on a nonperform-
ing director." Id. Term limits "make it easier to rotate [a director] off." Id.
76. Guhan Subramanian, Corporate Governance 2.0, HARV. Bus. REV. (Mar. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015
/03/corporate-governance-2-0. One advocate of term limits proposes a reconceptualization of corporate
governance that is based on three core principles. Id. The first principle is that "[b]oards [s]hould [h]ave the
[r]ight to [m]anage the [c]ompany for the []ong [t]erm." Id The second principle is that "[b]oards [s]hould
[i]nstall [m]echanisms to [e]nsure the [b]est [p]ossible [p]eople in the [b]oardroom." Id. Term limits could be
an instrument to achieve optimal board composition, ensuring a proper mix of skills and perspectives. Id.
Requiring meaningful director evaluations could also make opportunities for director improvement clear. Id.
The third principle is that "[b]oards [s]hould [g]ive [s]hareholders an [o]rderly [v]oice." Id This principle
involves understanding the board's role in a way that guarantees that shareholders have choice. Id.
77. See 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7. Director independence remains an important component of
good governance, although the idea of "independence" has remained an ideal open to many interpretations.
Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54.
78. 2017 BOARD INDEX, sapra note 7, at 13.
79. Id at 2, 5.
80. See infra Part IV.C.
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II. How TERM LIMITS MAY ADVANCE SEX DIVERSITY
This Part explores the theoretical basis for using term limits to achieve di-
versity on corporate boards. First, it will examine the particularities of sex di-
versity in the U.S. context and the advantages of incumbency. Next, this Part
will discuss arguments that both support and challenge the idea that term limits
might disrupt male overrepresentation on boards.
A. The Challenge of Diversity Regulation in the United States
Sex diversity in firm leadership remains shockingly low. As the New York
Times reported, fewer women run large corporations than men named John.8 '
Men named James, Robert, John, or William were four times more likely than
women of all names to become a CEO.8 2 This overrepresentation of men at the
upper echelons of the corporate world is astonishing.
Yet while 86% of directors participating in PwC's annual director survey
felt that women should comprise between 21% and 50% of the board, only
28% of Russell 3000 boards have more than one-fifth of their board comprised
of women. 83 Indeed, as of October 2017, women comprised an average of
16.2% of Russell 3000 boards.84 Larger companies have a slightly better out-
look, as women represent 19.7% of directors on Fortune 1000 boards.8 5
Further, some U.S. boards have failed even to attempt to promote gender
diversity. 86 A report noted that of the 1,500 largest Russell 3000 companies,
seventy-six companies had no female directors within the past decade.87 An
additional thirteen companies added a female director for the first time in
2016.88
81. Justin Wolfers, Fewer Women Run Big Companies Than Men Named John, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/upshot/fewer-women-run-big-companies-than-men-named-
john.html.
82. Id. The ratio of female CEOs to male CEOs of S&P firms is called the "Glass Ceiling Index"-
an index value above one means that Jims, Bobs, Jacks, and Bills combined outnumber the total number of
women. Id.
83. Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., Gender Parity on Boards Around the World, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5,2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-
parity-on-boards-around-the-world/.
84. See Marcec, supra note 17. Despite the fact that the percentage of women on Russell 3000 boards
was 16.2%, "the number of boards with zero women continues to decline .... and the number of boards
that have reached parity" has increased. Id.
85. 2020 Women on Boards Closes in on Nalional Campaign Goal, BUS. WIRE (Nov. 10, 2016, 6:01 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161110005237/en/2020-Women-Boards-Closes-National-
Campaign-Goal.
86. See Joann S. Lublin, Dotens of Boards Excluded Women for Years, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:03
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-boards-excluded-women-for-years-1482847381.
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At this current rate, projections show that corporate boards will not reach
gender parity until 2055.89 In reaction to this slow growth, groups such as the
Thirty Percent Coalition90 and 2020 Women on Boards91 have attempted to
increase female board participation at a faster rate, in part by refocusing the
criteria, and thereby the women, considered for directorships. 92
The efforts of these organizations have garnered increased support from
investors and large institutions.93 With State Street, Vanguard, and BlackRock
voicing their commitment to sex diversity,94 it is "unsurprising [that] in 2017
the number of board diversity proposals reached an all-time high."95 Proxy ad-
visors have also shown support for the movement. ISS, a leading shareholder
advisory firm, recommended that shareholders vote in favor of all but two of
the diversity proposals voted on in 2017.96
Still, crucial questions remain, such as what diversity we should prioritize
and how to identify diverse people.97 The variety of diversity recognized now
89. Jeff Green & Emily Chasan, Investors Push Corporate Boards to Add Women, Peoplk of Color,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-02/
shareholders-target-pale-male-and-stale-corporate-boards.
90. The Thirty Percent Coalition's website provides: "The mission of the Thirty Percent Coalition is
to promote gender diversity, including women of color, on corporate boards." Who We Are, THIRTY
PERCENT COALITION, https://www.30percentcoalition.org/who-we-are (follow "What is the Thirty Percent
Coalition?" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 10, 2019). Following the Coalition's institutional investors' initiatives,
close to 300 companies have appointed a woman to their boards and, in many instances, a woman of color.
Id. The Coalition's investors represent more than $4 trillion in assets under management and continue to
have a major impact Id
91. About, 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, https://www.2020wob.com/about (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).
The campaign 2020 Women on Boards seeks to make all boards composed of at least 20% women by the
year 2020. Id.
92. See id; @30PercentCo, TWITIER (Aug. 13, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://twitter.com/30PercentCo/
status/1161231019783131139.
93. For example, on April 27, 2017, a shareholder proposal to add women and minorities to the board
at Cognex Inc. has received 62.8% support, with major institutional investors voting in favor. Among the
supporters were Allianz, AXA Investment Managers, State Board of Administration of Florida, State of Wis-
consin Investment Board, Vanguard, BNY Mellon, and T. Rowe Price. Data was obtained from Proxy Insight
and is on file with the author.
94. See, e.g., Emily Chasan, BlackRock Puts Its Votes Behind Proposals to Get Women on Boards, BLOOMBERG
(July 13, 2017,7:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-14/blackrock-puts-its-votes-
behind-proposals-to-get-women-on-boards; Ryan Viastelica, Vanguard Calls for More Diverse Corporate Boards,
Better Climate-Change Disclosures, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 1, 2017, 7:37 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/vanguard-calls-for-more-diverse-corporate-boards-better-climate-change-disclosures-2017-08-31.
95. Ronald 0. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Proposal Develpments During the 2017 Proxy Season,
I-IARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12,2017), https:/corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/
07/12/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2017-proxy-season/ ("Thirty-five proposals calling
for the adoption of a policy on board diversity or a report on steps to increase board diversity were submitted
in 2017 as compared to 28 proposals submitted in 2016. As in 2016, a substantial number of board diversity
proposals were withdrawn, likely due to commitments made by companies to the proponents of these pro-
posals, such as adopting board recruitment policies inclusive of race and/or gender.").
96. Green & Chasan, supra note 89 (noting that according to ISS Analytics, 2017 shareholder proposals
regarding diversity were on pace to meet or exceed the number of similar proposals from 2016).
97. AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSiTY 191-92 (2015) (explaining that firms sometimes include identity categories
regarding diversity, such as race or gender, but can also define diversity ambiguously or not at all).
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in the United States prompts concern over any specific identity intervention,
such as sex quotas. Should the law remedy disparities of race, class, sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, and other types of diversity?" Even larger questions
besiege public diversity efforts such as: which methods and approaches work
best to ensure diversity? What do such efforts cost and to whom?
Sex diversity in U.S. corporate leadership has lagged behind European
firms. 99 Within the United States, quotas confront the barrier of a strong na-
tional emphasis on liberal notions of private property and a broad consensus
that the private sector should determine its own fate without regulatory inter-
ference. 0 0 Liberalism typically rejects drawing differences based on identity. Yet
countries that have utilized quotas assess compliance using the sex binary, im-
posing costs on men.1o1 Although in the long run this reliance on the sex binary
may advance equality overall, from a liberal standpoint, it may aggravate ine-
qualities.1 02
98. See generally Darren Rosenblum, Sex Quotas and Burkini Bans, 92 TUL. L. REV. 469 (2017) (exploring
the extent to which the advancement of women's rights comes at the disadvantage of other disenfranchised
groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities, in the context of French board quotas).
99. See Diversity and Women on Boards, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.
com/knowledge/technical-resources/the-uk-corporate-governance-portal/diversity-and-women-on-
boards-/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). The United Kingdom is an example of a county that considers other
categories besides gender. Id; see also Clark, supra note 13 (explaining that several European countries have
established or are considering quota legislation).
100. Proponents for the California proposed bill argue that, as "the 5th largest economy in the world[,
California] should set an example for globally enlightened business practices[, and that ]California has a re-
sponsibility to ensure that women are included in board discussions." CAL. S. RULES COMM., OFFICE OF
SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES FOR SB-826, AT 6 (2018), https://leginfo.egislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysis
Client.xhtrnl?bilid=201720180SB826 (follow "05/29/18- Senate Floor Analyses" hyperlink). They also
point out that "[r]esearch shows that corporations with female directors outperform companies that Pack]
women on boards." Id. Women directors would serve as "role models for aspiring women leaders [within]
corporations." Id at 7. Those who oppose the bill point out that a mandate "focused only on gender poten-
tially elevates it as a priority over other aspects of diversity[, and that] companies are not focused on just one
particular classification [of diversity], but rather all classifications." Id. The opponents also suggest the bill
would violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution. Id
101. See Loi 2011-103 du 27 janvier 2011 relative A la repr6sentation 6quilibr6e des femmes et des
hommes au sein des conseils d'administration et de surveillance et a I'6galit6 professionnelle [Law 2011-103
ofJanuary 27, 2011, on the Balanced Representation of Women and Men on Boards of Directors and Super-
visors and Equality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O. [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Jan. 28, 2011, p. 1680. France adopted a law that requires men and women each to have at least
40% representation on corporate boards in 2011. Id. However, this quota compels mixiti, which roughly
translates to sex diversity, but refers to a clear binary of male/female, mandating a binary distinction between
men and women. Mixiti, LAROUSSE FRENCH DICTIONARY, http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/
mixit%C3%A9A9/51851 (last visited Aug. 28, 2019); see also David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female
Syle in Corporate LeadershipEvidencefrom Quotas, 5 AM. ECONJ. 136, 137 (2013); Clark, supra note 13 (explaining
that Norway established a corporate board quota of 40% for either gender). Any person can acquire any skill
set regardless of identity, and therefore, identity should not be a limiting factor: "Men and women may differ
in the tools they choose to acquire, yet this does not in any way imply that they differ in the perspectives,
heuristics, interpretations, and predictive models that they could acquire." PAGE, supra note 10, at 307.
102. See general# KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF Us 65-
69 (1994) (discussing the fluidity of gender and sex). The binary excludes persons of other sexes and genders,
leaving them in a position of uncertainty. See id. People may transition from one sex to another or occupy a
middle ground as a third sex or intersex. See id They may also change from one gender to another, with or
226
2019] Board Diversity by Term Limits? 227
Furthermore, while Europe embraces quotas for women, U.S. debates over
equality remedies grow more conflicted, as evidenced by the market response
to the California quota.1 03 Moreover, quotas in the United States would face
substantial constitutional challenges, as we already see in response to the Cali-
fornia quota.l0
B. How Incumbeng Reduces Diversity
In the midst of this fraught debate, we considered whether the length of
board terms might affect inclusion efforts, shifting the focus from direct inter-
vention to facilitating market forces that could improve diversity. Rising gener-
ations of professionals reflect greater diversity. Perhaps one way to generate
greater inclusion would be to reduce incumbency to facilitate the inclusion of
new perspectives. 0 5 Newness matters because of the immense privilege incum-
bency confers on those possessing it.106
Political science literature on male overrepresentation in politics sheds light
on this issue in the corporate context. Scholars have demonstrated the ways in
which male dominance reproduces itself.1 07 Male incumbents draw on two in-
terrelated components: given and earned advantages. 0 8 "Given advantage," a
status that confers advantages on members of the dominant group, members
without medical assistance, without the purpose of "passing" as the other gender. Id Categories such as drag
queens and drag kings involve people who play around with gender identity and may not fall into such easy
categorization. Id.
103. See Joseph Grundfest, Mandating Gender Diversiy in the Corporate Boardroom: The Inevitable Failure of
Cafornia's SB 826, at 2-7 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 232, 2018), https://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3248791.
104. Felix von Meyerinck et al., As California Goes, So Goes the Nation? The Impact of Board Gender
Quotas on Firm Performance and the Director Labor Market 38 (Feb. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3303798; see also Tracy A. Thomas, Reconsidering the
Remedy of Gender Quotas, HARV.J.L. & GENDER (Nov. 21, 2016), http://harvardjlg.com/2016/l1/
reconsidering-the-remedy-of-gender-quotas/.
105. Li & Wahid, supra note 26.
106. See generally Alison Bailey, Privilege: Expanding n Mariyn Fge's 'Oppression," 29 J. Soc. PHIL. 104,
107-14 (1998).
107. Natalie Galea & Louise Chappell, The Power ofMascukne Privilege: Comparing Male Overrepresentation
in the Australian Poliical and Construction Sectors, EUR. CONSORTIUM POL. RES. 8 (2015),
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/db27f4fd-6ea4-47bc-ab7c-47e851750d69.pdf ("It is for this rea-
son, that Bjarneglrd (2013) and Murray (2014) in the tradition of Eveline (1994; 1998) call for a shift in how
gender inequality is problemati[c].") See, e.g., ELIN BJARNEGARD, GENDER, INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND
POLITICAL RECRUITMENT: EXPLAINING MALE DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION 1-15
(2013); Joan Eveline, Heay, Dirty and Limp Stories: Male Advantage at Work, in GENDER AND INSTITUTIONS:
WELFARE, WORK AND CITIZENSHIP 90 (Moira Gatens & Alison Mackinnon eds., 1998); Murray, supra note
36, at 520-28.
108. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege:A PersonalAccount of Coming to See Correspondences
Through Work in Women's Studies, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER: AN ANTHOLOGY 94 (3d ed. 1992); Bailey,
supra note 106, at 107-14. Natalie Galea refers to male "privilege," which we call "given advantage" because
of the widespread use of the term in ways that may generate more heat than light. Galea & Chappell, supra
note 107, at 8-9; see also ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48 (1977).
who have "defined and allocated values to different social categories."10 9 Insti-
tutions reflect these rules and practices and allow privilege to lead to power
through hierarchical systems. 110 People from socioeconomically privileged
backgrounds benefit from privileged educations, which lead to presumptions
of competence and highly ranked jobs. Once in those positions, some with
given advantage turn their positions into an "earned advantage" through an
acquired "skill, asset, or talent."' 1 ' Simply stated, through hard work and advan-
tageous placement, one can acquire abilities that have a market value.
Earned and given advantage intersect for incumbents, who acquire their
position through networks of privilege and then benefit from their status as
legitimate leaders within the company, leading firms to originally hire and, con-
sequently, retain them. The incumbents have proven themselves through their
earned advantage (often as former executives but also as experienced board
members) and maintain the privilege of legitimacy, as they fit the demographic
of the established hierarchy in firms. Not only do firms hesitate to force out
these incumbents, but incumbents themselves think their contributions to the
firm serve a unique and essential role. 112
Nominating committees tend to choose people who have skills familiar and
similar to theirs.11 3 Leaders find replacements for themselves in a process of
corporate elite reproduction. As firms recruit and promote people, "forces exist
which lead the men who manage to reproduce themselves in kind."1 14 The lead-
ers of the corporation view themselves as the standard-bearers for the corpo-
ration's success; their skills prove essential for the firm's continued profitability.
Because corporate leaders believe their own abilities form a central part of the
firm's continued success, they identify for promotion those subordinates whose
skills mirror their own.s1 5 It is no coincidence that men dominate among such
elites.
109. Galea & Chappell, supra note 107, at 8. See generally ALLAN G. JOHNSON, PRIVILEGE, POWER,
AND DIFFERENCE (2001).
110. Bailey, supra note 106, at 116.
111. Id.at109.
112. Interview transcript is with the authors.
113. See Amanda K. Packel, Government Intervention into Board Composition: GenderQuotas in Norway and
Diversity Disclosures in the United States, 21 STAN. J.L. BUs. & FIN. 192, 198 (2016) (book review) ("The board
nomination process relies very heavily on the social networks of existing directors, which tends to result in
newly appointed directors with sociodemographic characteristics similar to those of existing directors."); see
also KANTER, supra note 108, at 68 (explaining that as men recruit and promote people, they find candidates
that are reproductions of themselves, having the same skills as they do, which they view as valuable to the
company).
114. Id atvii.
115. See id. at 68 ("[I]he greater the tendency for a group of people to try to reproduce themselves,
the more constraining becomes the emphasis on conformity.").
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C Male Overrepresentation and Term Limits
Through this combination of earned advantage and privilege that develops
and extends over generations, men-as individuals and as a group-maintain
their positions within firms' boards, perhaps beyond their necessarily objective
advantage over potential replacements. Viewed across the cohort of board
members, this continued incumbency yields male overrepresentation, through
which men's representation on boards extends beyond what they necessarily
merit. Women's representation approaches only 20% of U.S. board positions.'16
This male overrepresentation surpasses that of the political sphere, a phenom-
enon which has begun to receive appropriate scholarly attention in the past five
years.' 17 Since men have locked in their control over corporate leadership, pub-
lic policy should limit the feedback loop that allows these men to continuously
select male successors and restrict the benefits of being an insider."18
Within the corporate sector, low turnover of directors limits the potential
for increased diversity. If companies appoint new directors infrequently, the
ability to increase the sex diversity of the board drops significantly.11 9 In addi-
tion, some cite lack of leadership experience as one of the main barriers to in-
creased gender diversity in the boardroom.1 20 Because women, as well as
minorities, have yet to hold leadership positions within corporate America on
the same scale and level as white men, this prerequisite for nomination limits
the number of diverse candidates.121 However, the limited pool argument does
not seem to fully explain the current disparities.1 22 Furthermore, the limited
116. See Kanter, supra note 17, at 987.
117. Rainbow Murray suggests "[c]urbing [male] overrepresentation [via] ceiling quotas for men"; this
can "promote[] meritocracy by ensuring the proper scrutiny of politicians of both sexes," as these quotas
"provide[] an impetus for improving the criteria used to select and evaluate politicians[,] neutralize the overly
masculinized environment," and "might facilitate better representation of both men and women." Murray,
supra note 36, at 520. Seegeneraly, BJARNEGARD, supra note 107.
118. Dara Roithmayr provides a parallel argument from the race context. She argues that whites es-
tablished their power through cartels that consistently excluded blacks from success-whether that meant
living in better neighborhoods or access to better jobs and professional networks. In all of these areas,
Roithmayr demonstrates how whites "locked in" their advantage. DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING
RACISM: How EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE 36-38 (2014).
119. See, e.g., DHIR supra note 97, at 44; Nili, supra note 26, at 139 ("m[The average turnover of board
members and appointment of new directors has decreased in recent years. [As of 2016], the number of new
appoint[ments] has dropped by twelve percent over the past 6ve years and by twenty-seven percent over the
past ten years.").
120. Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Cotporate Boards: How Much Difference Does
Difference Make?, 38 DEL.J. CORP. L. 377, 402-03 (2014). "The primary route to board directorship has long
been through experience as a CEO," and women have low representation in top executive positions, consti-
tuting only 3.5% of Fortune 1000 CEOs. Id.; see also DHIR, supra note 97, at 38-46.
121. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued Barriers to
Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 599-600 (2006) (discussing that corporations tend to select directors
with executive experience); Rhode & Packel, supra note 120, at 402-03.
122. See Packel, supra note 115, at 198-99 (discussing that women indicate that low representation on
boards results from the "closed social networks from which board appointments tend to draw," whereas men
indicate that low representation stems from the "pool problem").
230 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1:211
ability to network or add meaningful director experience for women exacer-
bates the issue, creating a self-perpetuating cycle.m2
Given how privilege entrenches men in board leadership positions and how
male board members replace themselves in those positions with similarly skilled
men, one might think that quotas for women present the only method for dis-
rupting men's lock on corporate power. Although term limits may not eradicate
sex disparities and that the various processes described above remain too strong
to allow for more board churn to effect much change. However, several argu-
ments explain why term limits and greater turnover in general might advance
diversity, breaking the hold of incumbency on boards.
1. Term Limits as Procedural Catalyst
Existing literature shows how the implementation of quotas for women led
firms to hire recruiting firms to assist them in finding women board mem-
bers.124 Firms with term limits or incentives to reduce tenure might adopt sim-
ilar measures, as the hiring needs become more frequent. In systematizing the
hiring process, the involvement of outside forces could disrupt the prior club-
like process, where nominating committees simply selected classmates and oth-
ers in their networks for new board positions.1 25 Without the ability to extend
terms, firms may find themselves using search firms to assist their process.
Through the formalization of crafting descriptions, hiring firms and interview-
ing boards may be limited as to how much they can rely on potentially discrim-
inatory notions of "fit" for the job.1 26
In addition to the systemization of the search process, term limits could
well expand the pool of candidates, therefore opening up more seats for
women. Quotas for women certainly expanded the pool in Europe by drawing
attention to potential board positions.1 27 Term limits may provide comparable
results to softer quotas. Forcing more turnover and creating more opportunities
123. Id. A 2012 study of 1,000 directors from fifty-eight countries found that while men tend to at-
tribute lack of diversity to a "small pool" argument, women mostly attributed it to the male network argu-
ment. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, supra note 46, at 1-3; Galea & Chappell, supra note 107, at 7 (explaining that
networking remains a masculine barrier for women seeking to be recruited to or retained on a board).
124. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 900; see also Murray, supra note 36, at 525 (explaining
how quotas "modify [firms'] recruitment practices and free up seats for women candidates" on boards).
125. Amanda Packel indicates that women are underrepresented on boards due partly to social closure,
or "the limited social networks of existing directors from which new directors often come." Packel, supra
note 115, at 197 (quoting DHIR, supra note 97, at 71).
126. "Fit" also plays a key role in ensuring that new people conform to the expectations of the firm's
established elite. See, e.g., Lauren A. Rivera, Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case ofElite Professional Senice Firms,
77 AM. Soc. REv. 999, 1006 (2012). Firms often deploy the language of "fit" to describe whether an individual
will succeed in a particular position. Id. at 1012. This subjective category reinforces extant social advantages
for particular groups, and it subtly weeds out difference. Id. at 1003. The value of diversity may go beyond
"fit" and its reduction of elite personnel to atomistic distinctions. Id. See generaly PAGE, supra note 10.
127. See Rosenblum, supra note 22.
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for people to join boards could inspire a broader group of people to seek board
positions. This hypothesis, of course, assumes that people currently opt out of
the pool because they presume a lack of real opportunity to penetrate the white
male-dominated board club.
Moreover, newness itself may connect to diversity, as some work demon-
strates. When new members join a group, it opens the potential to include dis-
tinct backgrounds, experiences and identities in the decision-making process.1 28
Some of the most persuasive work on diversity demonstrates that the diversity
of experience matters far more than diversity of identity.1 29 If boards pursue
better governance, they may deliberately seek out people with distinct experi-
ences and identities so as to advance new or diverse voices on the board.
2. Term Limits in Political Science
Political science research points to potentially useful elements of term lim-
its. 130 In the political context, term limits have been widely adopted,131 permit-
ting more diversity in politics by forcing long-serving politicians out.1 32 Political
service term limits, however, raise some issues. First, men may be more likely
than women to hit the ground running when their networks mentor them on
internal processes.1 33 Experienced politician networks often exclude women,
making it harder for them to acquire knowledge about how work hap-
pens. 3 4 Even so, it is conceivable that term limits do not foster greater women's
participation.1 35
Second, term limits, like any regulatory device, will relocate power. In the
political context, politicians move from one role to another, with local executive
128. Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 10, at 891 (explaining how women who were newly ap-
pointed to French boards were "more likely to be foreign, from non-elite professional and educational net-
works, less experienced and from specialties not traditionally represented on boards").
129. See id.
130. Murray, supra note 36 and accompanying text. See generally MAGDA HINOJOSA & JENNIFER M.
PISCOPO, PROMOTING WOMEN's RIGHT TO BE ELECTED: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF QUOTAS IN LATIN
AMERICA (2013), https://jenniferpiscopo.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/hinojosa-piscopo-final-english.pdf
(prepared for the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Branch of Mexico).
131. See Carl Hulse, As Trump Embraces Term Limits, Alies in Congress PullAway, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/us/politics/as-trump-embraces-term-limits-allies-in-
congress-pull-away.htnl.
132. See generally Susan J. Carroll & Krista Jenkins, Increasing Diversity or More of the Same? Term
Limits and the Representation of Women, Minorities, and Minority Women in State Legislatures (Aug. 30,
2001) (unpublished manuscript), https://cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/termlinmitsdiversity
.0.pdf.
133. See Murray, supra note 36, at 528.
134. Id. at 528. Masculine culture has served as a barrier to attracting women to firms and retaining
women; such. barriers "include informal recruitment, promotion and networking practices." Galea & Chap-
pell, supra note 107, at 7.




offices often conferring more power to an individual than a legislative of-
fice.136 A mayor has infinitely more options to influence policy than a city coun-
cil member. If a firm adopts a term-limit arrangement, it may find that the
remaining elite, more tenured members reshape the power structures to retain
their power. This correlates to Nili's "new insider" argument, in which firms
may respond to term limits by adopting informal rotations of company execu-
tives across leading firms, akin to cross-ownership arrangements in Europe. 37
Despite these potential unintended consequences, if we accept that term limits
cannot provide a panacea, they do present important opportunities for im-
proved governance.
3. Term Limits and the Changing Landscape of Shareholder Engagement
Granted, it may be the case that the structural bias that plagues boards may
remain with each newly appointed member. The argument follows that term
limits on their own do not alter the nature of or expand the pool of candidates,
nor do they alone change the perception of what makes someone a valuable
member of the board. If the definition of skills and expertise remains un-
changed, perhaps term limits do not alter much, especially considering the al-
ready existing wide pool of male elites.
Yet, unlike other areas of corporate law where incumbents have the latitude
to conduct the business of the corporation,1 38 board composition and sex di-
versity have become a focal point of the investor community. 39 Calls for in-
creased sex diversity in boardrooms are not new.140 With increasing evidence
136. See HINOJOSA & PISCOPO, supra note 130, at 11-12.
137. See general I MARKJ. ROE, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 49-
61 (2003); Mark J. Roe, PoklicalPreconditions to Separating Ownershp from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539,
570-73 (2000).
138. "Business-judgment rule" refers to the judicial:
presumption that in making business decisions not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing,
corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their
actions are in the corporation's best interest. This rule shields directors ... from liability for un-
profitable or harmful corporate transactions if the transactions were made in good faith, with due
care, and within the directors' or officers' authority.
Business judgment Rule, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
139. Beth Healy, State Street Global Advisors Presses Companies It Invests in to Add Women to Boards, BOS.
GLOBE (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/03/07/state-street-global-advisors-
presses-companies-invests-add-women-boards/cE1LWXt6tK7DfveYnlFmpJ/story.html.
140. See, e.g., KANTER, supra note 108; Kanter, supra note 17 (arguing in 1977 for critical mass theory
and the need for boards to have at least 35% of directors be female to introduce new perspectives and increase
corporate performance). For continued advocacy of the need for representation see FISHER, supra note 17.
See also Li & Wahid, supra note 26 (discussing studies by Stevens (1978), Staw and Ross (1980), Janis (1982),
and Beasley (1996) which explored board tenure length and its relation to board governance).
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linking boardroom diversity with company performance, 141 the push for diver-
sity has gained traction within the investor community.1 42 State Street, Van-
guard, and BlackRock have all taken public steps to promote and advocate for
greater board diversity.1 43 State Street and BlackRock have specifically drawn a
line in the sand regarding sex diversity: promote more women or risk being
voted out.144 Even more recently, the New York City Comptroller and the New
York City Pension Funds launched their own initiative focusing on board di-
versity disclosure,1 45 and ISS and Glass Lewis have announced a new focus on
gender diversity.1 "
Investors have also been supporting these proposals more broadly.1 47 Di-
versity proposals that were voted on received, on average, 2 8 .3 % of votes cast
in 2017-compared to only 19.1% of votes cast in 2016-with 25% of such
proposals passing and many more settling prior to a vote.148 Most of these pro-
posals requested that boards increase the diversity of their candidate pools, es-
tablish practices for identifying and adding female board directors,1 49 and
141. The Bottom Line: Connecting Corporate Performance & Gender Diversity, CATALYST (Jan 15, 2004),
http://www.catalystorg/media/companies-more-women-board-directors-experience-higher-financial-
performance-according-latest. One survey affirms that "greater diversity in boards and management are em-
pirically associated with higher returns on equity, higher price/book valuations and superior stock price per-
formance." CREDIT SUISSE, THE CS GENDER 3000: WOMEN IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT 3 (2014),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/diversity-forum-credit-suisse-report-2015.pdf.
142. Healy, supra note 139.
143. See, e.g., Chasan, supra note 94; Vlastelica, supra note 94.
144. Sharo M. Atmeh et al., State Street GlobalAdisors Announces New Gender Diversity Guidance, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03
/09/state-street-global-advisors-announces-new-gender-diversity-guidance/; BlackRock Vows New Pressure on
CAmate, Board Diversity, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2017, 3:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/13/blackrock-
vows-new-pressure-on-climate-board-diversity.html.
145. CamberView Partners, NYC Pension Funds Boardroom Accountabity Proiect Version 2.0, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sep. 19, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/
19/nyc-pension-funds-boardroom-accountability-project-version-2-0/.
146. ISS Announces 2018 Benchmark Polig Updates, ISS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.issgovernance.
com/iss-announces-2018-benchmark-policy-updates/ (announcing adoption of a new policy on board gen-
der diversity in Canada); Dimitri Zagoroff, Pody Guidelnes Updated United States, Canada, Shareholder Initiatives,
GLASS LEWIS (Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.glasslewis.com/policy-guidelines-updated-united-states-canada-
shareholder-initiatives/ (announcing "a phased policy that will see nomination committee chairs targeted with
against/withhold recommendations if boards do not include a female director, or provide a cogent explana-
tion for their absence, by 2019").
147. See Green & Chasan, supra note 89. "ISS[, for instance,] recommended that shareholders vote
'for' all but two of the [diversity] proposals voted on in 2017." Mueller & Ising, supra note 95.
148. Mueller & Ising, supra note 95.
149. For example, Discovery Communications received the following proposal in 2016:
Shareholders request that the Board of Directors prepare a report by September 2016, at reason-
able expense and onitting proprietary information, on steps Discovery Communications is taking
to foster greater diversity on the Board over time including but not limited to the following-
1. The inclusion of women and minority candidates in every pool from which Board nominees
are chosen and our company's plan to advance Board diversity;
2. An assessment of challenges experienced and progress achieved.
Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 76 (Mar. 30, 2016). In 2017, Discovery re-
ceived the following proposal:
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provide reports on actions taken by boards to increase diversity, or both. 150 One
way investors affect policy is by withholding votes from directors' nominees to
signal their dissatisfaction to the board.' 5 '
As a result, women are more likely to fill new seats. Indeed, women and
minorities accounted for half of the 397 newest independent directors at S&P
500 companies in 2017.152 Additionally, the California State Teachers Retire-
ment System (CalSTRS), a pension fund and activist investor, submitted letters
to 125 California corporations without female directors, strongly suggesting the
inclusion of women on the board.153 Subsequently, thirty-five of these boards
added at least one woman.1 54
Shareholders request that the Board of Directors of Discovery Communications adopt a policy
for improving board diversity (the 'Policy) requiring that the initial list of candidates from which
new management-supported director nominees are chosen (the 'Initial List) by the Nominating
and Corporate Governance Committee should include (but need not be limited to) qualified
woman [sic] and minority candidates. The Policy should provide that any third-party consultant
asked to furnish an Initial List will be asked to include such candidates.
Discovery Comrnmc'ns, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 89 (Apr. 5, 2017).
150. See generally Rajeev Kumar, 2016 Annual Corporate Governance Review, GEORGESON (2016),
https://www.georgeson.com/us/Documents/acgr/acgr
2 0l6.pdf. Though influential institutional investors
such as the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) strongly support such proposals,
some fund managers prefer to vote against such proposals and engage directly with the board. See, e.g., Green
& Chasan, supra note 89.
151. If management ignores successful shareholder proposals, proxy advisory firms are likely to rec-
ommend against votes on individual directors (or the entire board), and such directors could be subject to
potential withhold campaigns. See, e.g., GLASS LEWIS & CO., PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: 2015 PROXY
SEASON 7 (2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20160401 213843/http:/www.glasslewis.com/assets/
uploads/2013/12/2015_GUIDELINESUnited_States.pdf; INSTIrUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., UNITED
STATES SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: 2015 BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 13
(2014), https://www.issgovemance.com/file/policy/20 1 5ussummaryvotingguidelines.pdf. "In essence, such
practice has transferred so[-]called precatory shareholder proposals into quasi-binding resolutions." Kobi
Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the 'Absent" Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors'Apathy, 41 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 55, 76 (2016); see also Paul Rose, Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 2179, 2189-90 (2014). See generally Yonca Ertimur et al., Board of Directors' Responsiveness to Shareholders:
Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2010) (providing empirical evidence that managers and
directors who ignore majority-vote shareholder proposals are more likely to face sanctions in the labor mar-
ket); Kobi Kastiel, AgainstAll Odds: Hedge FundActivism in Controlled Companies, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60
(discussing the mechanism behind the increasing disciplinary effect of SEC Rule 14a-8 shareholder pro-
posals).
152. Jeff Green, Women & Minorities Are the Majority ofNew Board Seats for the First Time, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 6, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-06/women-minorities-
capture-most-new-board-seats-for-first-time. According to a recent survey released by Spencer Stuart, of 397
independent director slots open in the 2017 proxy season, 36% went to women. See 2017 BOARD INDEX,
supra note 7, at 3.
153. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Pnoritiging Board Diversity, NARV.
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4. Empty Term Limits
Not all term limits are created equal. As we further detail in Part III below,
a great variance exists in the design of term limits. In that respect, for term
limits to truly achieve their goal of limiting the ability of directors to overstay
their time on a board, they must be "effective" term limits. In many cases, com-
panies may announce the adoption of "empty" term-limit arrangements-ones
with long implementation periods or extensive exemptions. These empty term-
limit arrangements are designed in a manner that would not apply to the vast
majority of directors and would render them ineffective.
For instance, take a company that adopts a term-limit arrangement that re-
quires a director to leave after twenty years of service but also allows the board
to extend the tenure of a director at its discretion. Although most directors
retire before serving for twenty years, the board is likely to extend the tenure
even beyond twenty years if a director is not ready to retire.
To be sure, even in the small subset of companies in the United States that
have addressed board tenure, a majority set their threshold at or above fifteen
years,155 with many including exceptions for discretionary extensions by the
board.15 6 Therefore, for term limits to be a useful tool in the context of sex
diversity, they must first be designed as an effective mechanism for creating
turnover. Not surprisingly, in light of the lax term-limit arrangements, firms
with term limits exhibit mixed results compared to a matched sample of firms
without term limits. 15 7 These mixed results suggest both what drives the adop-
tion of term limits and the need for more effective term limits.
As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, term-limit companies exhibit striking dif-
ferences compared to the larger universe of companies, as well as to the set of
matched companies. Whether as a direct result of the tenure limit or because
these companies simply attend more to tenure as a corporate governance issue,
term limit firms have a lower tenure than the rest of the sample, as well as when
compared with the matched sample.
In 2016, for example, the term-limit sample's average tenure was 8.6 years
while in the matched sample it was 9.64 years. It should be noted that while the
total sample's average tenure has seen a decline in the last few years, average
tenure has been trending up in the term-limit sample.
155. 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 5;Julie Hembrock Daum, Board Evoluion: The Forces Driving
Board Composition and Succession, in 2018 GOVERNANCE OUTLOOK: PROJECTIONS ON EMERGING BOARD
MATTERS 1, 1(2018), https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/pdf-files/research-and-insight-pdfs/
nacd2018.pdf.
156. See, e.g., MASTERCARD INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 6 (2015),
https://s2.q4cdn.com/242125233/files/doc downloads/2018/10/Corporate-Governance-Guidelines-
Sept-2018-Final.pdf [hereinafter MASTERCARD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES].
157. This is based on propensity score matching.
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Figure 1. Average Board Tenure in a Matched Sample
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Similar findings appear in Figure 2 below. The ratio of sex diversity in the
term-limit sample surpasses both that of the matched sample and of the S&P
1500. For instance, in 2016, the percentage of women on boards in the S&P
1500 was 17.8%/, while it stood at 27.5%/ in the term-limit sample. Yet again,
the trend lines offer a more nuanced story. While the S&P 1500 and the
matched sample saw significant improvement over the last six years, the in-
crease in sex diversity among the term-limit firms proved more muted. In that
respect, it seems that although the tenure-limit firms began from a better posi-
tion, other companies are catching up.
Figure 2. Sex Diversity Ratio in a Matched Sample
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Indeed, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that while term-limit firms have performed
better in having lower overall tenure and higher sex diversity, their trend lines
lag behind the rest of the market, including their matched firms. Tables 1 and
2 confirm these results, showing a negative (nonsignificant) correlation between
increased tenure and diversity in the term-limit firms, while surprisingly show-
ing a positive correlation in the matched sample.158




Average Tenure -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0083
Year 0.0083 0.0082 0.0083
More Than 30% of Board with
Fewer Than Six Years of Tenure
More Than 50/o of Board with 0.0073
Fewer Than Six Years of Tenure
Constant 0.2229*** 0.2336*** 0.2299***
N 131 131 131
R2 0.0188 0.0194 0.0193




Average Tenure .0027 .0076** -.0006
Year .0163*** .0151*** .0161***
More Than 30% of Board with
Fewer Than Six Years of Tenure .0466
More Than 50% of Board with -.0374
Fewer Than Six Years of Tenure
Constant .0964*** .0278 .1336***
N 133 133 119
R2 .1583 .1984 .1746
158. Tables 1 and 2 present the results from Ordinary Least Square regressions, where the dependent
variable is Female Board Percentage. This data includes nineteen companies with board-tenure limits and
nineteen companies that match with the above table based on propensity score matching. Each column pre-
sents OLS results for Average Board Tenure, Year, and whether more than 30% or 50% of the board had
fewer than six years of Tenure. Because the dependent variable is expressed in the form of a percentage, each
variable indicates the percentage point change based on a one-unit change of the variable. For example, in
the first column of Table 1, a one-year increase in Average Board Tenure results in a 0.12 percentage point
decrease in Female Board Percentage, and in the first column of Table 2, a one-year increase in average board
tenure results in a 0.32 percentage point increase in Female Board Percentage. Asterisks (***, * *) indicate
statistical significance (at 1%, 5%, 10%).
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Firms that adopted term limits have better male-to-female ratios and lower
overall tenure compared to those that did not. Interestingly, we also docu-
mented a much stronger trajectory of improvement within the companies that
did not adopt term limits.
In that sense, after an initial period of refreshment, companies with term
limits may experience stagnation. There may even be some tokenism at work,
shielding these firms from further investor pressure based on their superior
baseline statistics. Specific term-limit arrangements must be appropriate for a
company's governance structure.
In sum, term limits may foster increased inclusion of distinct experiences
and identities. As with any remedy, policymakers must be aware of circumven-
tion efforts to ensure that these mechanisms truly advance their goals. Indeed,
as this Part demonstrated, of the few firms with term limits in place, only a few
have implemented their limits with any efficacy.
III. TERM LIMITS CORRELATE WITH INCREASED SEX DIVERSITY
Parts I and II laid out the normative backdrop regarding term limits and
the potential use of tenure restrictions in the context of promoting better sex
diversity in boardrooms. Yet, Part II also demonstrated the challenge posed by
term-limit data. We now turn to examine the envisioned product of widely
adopted and effective term limits-greater board turnover (often referred to as
board refreshment).
Part III provides novel empirical findings regarding the interaction of
board refreshment with sex diversity. We find that board turnover does in fact
correlate with an increase in sex diversity.
Our findings draw on quantitative and qualitative data. First, we examined
the S&P 1500 companies and provided overall data on board turnover and sex
diversity.159 Second, we investigated whether S&P 1500 firms that have gone
through a tenure "shock"-reflected through a large drop in their average
board tenure-have also experienced a diversity boost. In addition to the quan-
titative data, we conducted interviews with several high-ranking executives in
S&P 1500 companies to survey their views on term limits and board diversity.
From the data above, we get a more complete picture of how tenure correlates
with sex diversity.
159. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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A. The Correlation Between Tenure and Diversity
The overall trends in diversification provide essential background for un-
derstanding how turnover affects firms. As Figure 3 notes, recent years have
seen a widespread trend toward increased inclusion of women on boards.
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Overall, firms showed a marked increase, from nearly 12.5% in 2011 to
nearly 18% in 2016. This increase in the United States occurred without any
major regulatory efforts-it is owed to the increasingly widespread presump-
tion that firms without any women on their boards fail to meet norms of gov-
ernance. 160 Importantly, Figure 3 also shows that after a steady increase in the
average tenure of boards, the last few years have reversed the trend. Starting in
2015, board tenure has been declining, and as Figure 3 illustrates, that decrease
in average tenure has been accompanied by an increase in the rate of women
who joined S&P 1500 boards.
The broader phenomenon reveals how prominent the effect of turnover is.
Table 3 provides a regression analysis of the S&P 1500 companies over the
2010-2016 time period. A decrease in board tenure correlates significantly with
an increase in sex diversity. Conversely, a one-year increase in average board
tenure results in a 0.24 percentage point decrease in female board percentage.
160. See Business Roundtable, supra note 32 (indicating that to achieve effective board structure, it is
vital to "develop a framework for identifying ... diverse candidates that allows the nominating/corporate
governance committee to consider women, minorities and others with diverse backgrounds as candidates for
each open board seat").
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But when a substantial number of relatively new directors populate the
board, the marked effects surface. When at least 30% of a board has served for
less than six years, an increase in the average tenure is actually correlated with
an improved ratio of women on the board. Perhaps many women may tend to
stay for shorter tenures, 161 therefore improving the ratios on boards where they
do stay longer.
However, when at least half of the board is relatively new, an increase in
the tenure again correlates with reduced sex diversity. It may be that the board
has exhausted the turnover process, reducing the likelihood of adding new
members, including women.




Average Tenure -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.0032***
Year 0.0108*** 0.0107*** 0.0108***
More Than 30% of Board with 0.0163***
Fewer Than Six Years of Tenure
More Than 50% of Board with
Fewer Than Six Years of Tenure -0.0117***
Constant 0.1302*** 0.1097*** 0.1402**
N 9,416 9,416 9,416
R2  0.0511 0.055 0.0528
While in this study we focus on one driver of sex diversity on boards-
director tenure-it is important to underscore that the reasons leading compa-
nies and directors to board refreshment vary. They could stem from a push by
investors for greater diversity, business struggles, activism events, or other rea-
sons. These factors can help explain why directors may have longer tenure in
some companies but not in others. We do, however, highlight the fact that when
companies do add new directors to the boardroom, those additional directors
tend to improve board diversity.
B. The Impact of Tenure Shock on Sex Diversity
This Part turns to the question of whether significant board turnover
(whether through term limits or not) isfollowed by greater sex diversity. We define
161. See general# Nili, supra note 26.
162. The dependent variable is Female Board Percentage. Each column presents OLS results for Av-
erage Board Tenure, Year, and whether more than 30% or 50% of the board had fewer than six years of
Tenure. The More than 30% and 50% variables are a null variable for whether that statement is true. Asterisks
(***, **, *) indicate statistical significance (at 1%, 5%, 10%).
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a tenure shock as a situation in which the board's aggregate average tenure has
dropped by more than one full year. Since the tenure of each incumbent board
member increases each year, a full-year drop reflects a departure of more than
one director, or at the very least the departure of a very long-tenured director,
who often carries significant clout in the boardroom. Given that, on average,
only 5% of directors leave their positions in a given year, 63 the departure of
multiple directors in the same year constitutes an uncommon event and there-
fore constitutes what we term a "tenure shock."
While we make no normative assumptions as to the reason firms experi-
ence a tenure shock, we do find that when boards lose more directors than they
otherwise normally would, they subsequently experience improvement in their
sex-diversity ratio. Although various reasons may cause the tenure shock, in
general such firms prove more likely to improve their diversity compared to
those who do not. While we do not endeavor to identify causality, we do add
color to the finding of a negative correlation between tenure and diversity,
showing that following a tenure shock, diversity improves.
Table 4 below explores the effect of decreasing the average tenure in a
company by one year on the sex diversity in that same year and the following
year. We find that this drop of tenure is positively associated with an increase
in the average proportion of female board members in that company in the
following two years.
Table 4. Tenure Shock Correlates with Greater Sex Diverilyl64
Diversity Diversity Diversity Diversity Diversity
in 2015-2016 in 2014-2015 in 2013-2014 in 2012- in 2011-
After a After a After a 2013 After 2012 After
Tenure Tenure Tenure a Tenure a Tenure
Shock'6 Shock Shock Shock Shock
in 2015 in 2014 in 2013 in 2012 in 2011
Improved 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004***
Diversity (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Note: *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01
163. 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 2; see also infra Part I.
164. OLS regressions of change in diversity on change in tenure. Positive coefficients suggest that a
decrease in tenure is associated with an increase in diversity. Diversity is measured as a proportion (0-1).
Here we are looking at one-year lags.
165. A tenure shock is defined as a drop of one year or more in the average tenure of the board in
the following year.
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Table 5 examines a longer horizon for the tenure shock and finds that even
when the shock in tenure spans over two years, sex diversity improves similarly.
Table 5. Tenure Drops Over Two-Year Periods Correlate with Greater Sex Diversity'66
Diversity Diversity Diversity Diversity
in 2015-2016 In 2014-2015 in 2013-2014 in 2012-2013
After a Tenure After a Tenure After a Tenure After a Tenure
Shock 67 During Shock During Shock During Shock During
2013-2015 2012-2014 2011-2013 2010-2012
Improved 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004***
Diversity (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01
Taken together, Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that boards that experienced
a great deal of turnover added more women than boards lacking increased turn-
over.
C Qualitative Data on Term-Limit Firms
1. The Term-Limit Companies
Qualitative data on the firms that have adopted term limits reveal the prom-
ise of these measures as well as their limitations. The provisions that firms adopt
vary significantly, and this variation makes it even more challenging to draw
conclusions as to the effectiveness of these arrangements. As Table 6 illustrates,
such policies vary in term length, in effective dates, and in the ability of the
board to override tenure limits-what we term "exemption clauses."
166. OLS regressions of change in diversity on change in tenure. Positive coefficients suggest that a
decrease in tenure is associated with an increase in diversity. Diversity is measured as a proportion (0-1).
Here we are looking at one-year lags for tenure drop.
167. A tenure shock is defined as a drop of one year or more in the average tenure of the board in
the following year.
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Table 6. Term-Limit Provisions
Company Tem gtit L Year Exemption Clauses
Only applies to directors nominated
Alaska Air 15 2016 after 2012. Board retains right to
waive this standard.
Allegion 10 70 2014
AvalonBa The exact timing will depend on theComniay 12 2016 needs of the board. Only applies to
nonemployee directors.
CBRE Group 12 2015
Board retains right to decide whether
to accept director's letter of resigna-
Disney 15 2014 tion at the end of their term. Tenure
policy only applies to nonemployee
directors.
Frontier 15 2006 The Board retains the right to renomi-
nate.
GE 15 75 2015 Board may renominate in "special cir-
cumstances."
Only applies to directors nominated
Illumina 10 2015 in 2016 or later. Employee directors
are exempt. Board may renominate
under special circumstances.
Flavor & Exemption for officers and any
Fragrance 12 72 2011 "grandfathered persons," whose age is
Specialties equal to or exceeds seventy-five.
Juniper 10 75 2008Networks
No more than two directors shall re-
Mastercard 15 72 2016 tire pursuant to this provision at any
one time. Board can extend under ex-
tenuating circumstances.
Patterson Only applies to independent directors.
Companies 20 75 2013 Governance committee can grant ex-
ceptions.
Proctor & 18 72 2015 Board can grant exemptions.
Gamble
Qorvo 15 75 2015 Only applies to nonemployee direc-
tors.
Signet 15 75 2017 Board can grant exemptions.
Jewelers
Target 20 2014 Only applies to nonemployees. Board
can grant exemptions.
Varian 15 2007
Exemption for directors with particu-
Walmart 12 75 2015 lar skills until a suitable replacement is
found.
Xcel Energy 15 72 2005 Only applies to nonemployee direc-
tors nominated after 2000.
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As evidenced by the table, typical term limit lengths range from ten to eight-
een years, with Target imposing the twenty-year outlier limit. Some firms, like
General Electric (GE), Mastercard, and Proctor & Gamble, enforce a manda-
tory retirement age as well. The most common limits are seventy-two and sev-
enty-five years, though Allegion kicks in retirement at seventy years.
Exemption clauses abound. For example, Target and Disney exempt all
employee-directors, while GE only exempts the company CEO, provided that
it may re-nominate directors in "special circumstances." Mastercard's policy
more broadly allows the Board to extend a director's term in "extenuating cir-
cumstances."
Alaska Air's policy represents a typical example of a large-cap firm, impos-
ing a 15-year term limit for its board members that applies to directors who
began in 2012 or later.' 68 Per the policy, the board retains the right to waive the
term limit at its discretion.1 69 The limitations of this policy reveal how slowly
typical term limits work-Alaska Air's term would only affect directors after
2027 at the earliest. Even so, Alaska Air's board has become much more diverse
since the adoption of this provision. 70
Walmart implemented a similar policy, including a twelve-year term limit
with exceptions to encourage "a mix of longer-tenured directors and newer di-
rectors with fresh perspectives."171 Since adoption, Walmart's board has gotten
smaller and younger.1 72 The board's median age dropped from sixty-five in 2015
to fifty-four in 2017, a significant, eleven-year difference.1 73 This change reflects
the potential for term limits to improve age and gender diversity.
168. See ALASKA AIR GRP., INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 4 (2018), http://investor.
alaskaair.com/static-files/5e331423-881f-4c65-b46d-3ddf762572fa [hereinafter ALASKA AIR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES]; 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 5.
169. ALASKA AIR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 168, at 4.
170. The board of directors for Alaska Air has gone from 30% female in 2011 to 50% female in 2018.
See Alaska Air Group, Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders (Schedule 14A) 9-12 (2011),
http://investor.alaskaair.com/static-files/793c489e-36e7-450d-ac2c-12a9648ebbal (listing ten candidates
for the 2011 board of directors, three of which were women); Brad Tilden, Leading the West Coast with 50%
Women on Our Board, ALASKA AIRLINES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://blog.alaskaair.com/values/people/gender-
diversity/.
171. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2016 Notice of Annual Shareholders' Meeting and Proxy Statement (Sched-
ule 14A), at 30 (June 3, 2016).
172. See Reuters, Why Walmart Is Shiinking Its Board of Directors, FORTUNE (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/04/21 /walmart-board-directors/; Kim Souza, Median Age of Wal-Mart Stores Board
ofDirectors Falls Below 55, TALK BUS. & POL. (Apr. 25, 2017, 4:06 PM), http://talkbusiness.net/2017/04/
median-age-of-wal-mart-stores-board-of-directors-falls-below-55/. Walmart's changing board demographics
support the utility of future research addressing the relationship between term limits and age diversity.
173. Souza, supra note 172. Regarding the simultaneous retirement of four board members, the Chair-
man of the Board of Directors Greg Penner says, "[W]e view this as a time to make our board more nimble,
while maintaining its independence and further aligning on Walmart's strategic priorities." Walmart Positions
Board ofDirectorsfor the Future, WALMART (Apr. 20, 2016), http://news.walmart.com/2016/04/20/walmart-
positions-board-of-directors-for-the-future. These "strategic priorities" and "customer requirements" in-
clude a strong focus on technology and e-commerce. Id. Walmart demonstrates further commitment to new-
age technological interests with the introduction of younger, more technologically inclined and already-in-
volved directors like the president and CEO of Yahoo!, Inc. and the CEO and cofounder of Instagram. Id.
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Importantly, firms enact tenure policies for various company-specific rea-
sons-an aspect not reflected in Table 6. For example, GE adopted a fifteen-
year term limit in September 2015 after shareholders led a two-year battle
against the board.174 The firm also adopted a retirement age and annual board
evaluations-changes meant to force the Board to improve its governance.175
On the other hand, Disney's tenure policy seeks "to balance the benefits of
continuity with the benefits of fresh viewpoints and experience."17 6 Disney
Chairman and CEO Robert Iger, who led the firm through immense growth,
discussed the negative effects of holding corporate power over a long term:
"When your convictions prove to be right more than wrong, you get really con-
fident. . . . You easily get more dismissive of other people's ideas and other peo-
ple's convictions."1 77 Iger's retirement in advance of his term's completion does
not reflect the term limit's effect and reveals that often the departure of key
talent has little to do with term-limit policies178 These examples demonstrate
that term limits, as they currently exist, do not yet achieve the turnover that
good governance demands.
174. GE Announces Board Shakeup, Change in CEO Pay, Fox BUS. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.fox
business.com/markets/2016/03/14/ge-announces-board-shakeup-change-in-ceo-pay.html. In a Q&A in-
troductory portion of GE's 2016 proxy statement, lead director John J. Brennan discussed the fifteen-year
director-term-limit policy enthusiastically, saying that it "came out of the Board's [own] self-evaluation pro-
cess." Gen. Elec. Co., Notice of 2016 Annual Meeting & Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 1 (Apr. 27,
2016) [hereinafter 2016 GE Proxy Statement]. Brennan believes that such a policy will allow for a more di-
verse board in terms of mixed ages and tenures. Id. GE's director qualifications' policy is geared towards
creating "an experienced Board with expertise in areas relevant to GE." Id.; see also GEN. ELEC. CO.,
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 3 (2017), https://www.ge.com/sites/default/files/GE-govemance-principles.
pdf. Because it makes sense that these relevant areas and the expertise about them will constantly evolve, the
term-limit policy corresponds well with their future goals.
175. Cam C. Hoang, Intitutional Investors and Trends in Board Refreshment, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 8, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/08/institutional-
investors-and-trends-in-board-refreshment/.
176. THE WALT DISNEY CO., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 10 (2014), https://ditm-twdc
-us.storage.googleapis.com/Corporate-Governance-Guidelines.pdf. An article dated December 2013 dis-
cusses board memberJudith L. Estrin's tenure and her inability to stand for reelection due to her fifteen years
of service, further implying that the term-limit implementation occurred before 2014. Jay Yarrow, Twitter
CofounderJack Dorsy IsJoining Disny's Board, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 23, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/jack-dorsey-disney-board-2013-12.
177. Brooks Barnes, Robert Iger, Disny's CE.O., Agrees to One-Year Extension, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/business/media/robert-iger-disneys-ceo-agrees-to-one-
year-extension.htnl.
178. One imagines the rest of Disney's board finds changes like losing Iger at sixty-six years old with
three years left in his term hard to digest, as his stepping down is neither the result of mandatory retirement
or term-service tenure. Disney has struggled to find an adequate successor, as Iger's tenure brought Disney
into major acquisitions like Pixar, Marvel Entertainment, and Lucasfilm, which led to Disney's 2016 $7 billion




2. Interview with Term-Limit-Company Executive
We interviewed a corporate secretary for a large-cap, term-limit firm to as-
certain the effects of the limit on the firm's governance. The corporate secretary
reported that the term limit functions to guide the board in how to plan for
succession:
We've jockeyed around who's going when. We may think a particular director
is really important so we defer succession discussion and then move to focus
on succession for another director. For example, we may be three-fourths of
the way through a failed search for director A, and then quit and start to work
on director B instead.' 79
In this sense, the term limit provides a framework for considering how to adjust
the board's composition.
This firm's board had a mindset that was generally progressive:
[TJhe board is very progressively minded. That's their personality .... Who-
ever chose these people to sit on the board, their profile is universally quite
progressive. Not all the same person, and politics vary, but they're very aligned
on certain topics. The board embraces warmly inclusion and diversity, but
they'll tell you they're pragmatic-they'd be the last board to accept a quota;
they don't believe in that, but they do believe in the diversity of experience at
the table, and that implies diversity of other types-gender, race etc.180
This mindset reflects the notion that sex diversity links in some circumstances
with broader kinds of diversity. Inclusion of a term-limit provision can convey
a desire for greater inclusion overall without explicitly mandating any gender-
classification policies, such as a quota system.
The interview revealed a core truth as to why term limits prove essential to
good governance:
Established companies will continue to fight as long as they can because it's
difficult to change the game midstream. Few directors think they are subject
to the rules. There's a reason they think the rules don't apply to them. They
think they're special, and there's a reason-a real reason-that it's important
for them to stay. It's asking them to be big and mature, and most people are
not capable.' 8
In short, directors view their contributions to the firm as unique, and they view
their membership on the board as one that cannot be duplicated. It is this faith
in the uniqueness of their own contributions that creates a collective resistance
to term limits and their implementation.
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D. Discussion of the Main Findings
We analyzed the 1,500 largest firms in the United States to ascertain
whether reduced tenure correlates to an increase in sex diversity on boards. The
data confirms the significance of this correlation. To confirm this finding, we
also examined firms with an outsized turnover-firms that have experienced
what we call a tenure shock. These "tenure shock" firms see an improvement
in sex diversity. We see that companies that go through unusual turnover (lead-
ing to a drop of more than one year in the average tenure of the board) improve
their sex diversity in the subsequent years.
Before we interpret our data, the broader market's shift toward more inclu-
sion merits attention. This upward trend of inclusion with regard to sex now
appears inexorable. Many of the world's top firms reside in countries now sub-
ject to quotas for women on boards and their boards now include between one-
third and one-half women. California brought quotas to the United States, and
while we cannot ascertain whether its statute will survive a constitutionality
challenge or whether other states will follow suit, state oversight has put firms
on notice as to their inclusivity. The potential for legislation can only build more
market pressure for inclusion.
As norms shift toward greater inclusion, firms with fewer women find
themselves outside the norm. The first analysis, which reveals a correlation be-
tween turnover and increased sex diversity, makes perfect sense in the context
of an overall market in which sex equality improves. Each instance of the re-
placement of a board position provides the firm with an opportunity for greater
inclusion of women. In a context of rising equality, it makes sense that firms
with more refreshment-more opportunities for equality-will include more
women.
Interpreting our data with this background in mind, we credit this correla-
tion to external and internal shifts. External forces include not only the overall
market pressure but also the rise in investor and advocate activism. In the past,
firms may have ignored activist investors, but now their response is a more
receptive one. As sex diversity has grown over the last few years, companies
have felt an increasing pressure to fill board seats that become vacant with sex-
diverse nominees. Indeed, in that respect, the increased churn of board seats
combined with the external pressure to fill these seats with women may sub-
stantially contribute to the correlation we identify.
Second, and perhaps more interesting, are the internal shifts taking place
that may foster this higher level of inclusion. As boards reduce their tenure,
they may also experience a positive culture jolt. As long-tenured male directors
leave the board, the board includes a newer generation of directors. This gen-
eration will inevitably be more inclusive of women and may look outside the
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old network that has mainly produced directors in the past.182 In that sense, the
beginning of this transformation may unleash an internal pressure to diversify
further. This internal pressure exists not only in any heightened-turnover situa-
tion but also when a tenure shock has occurred.
We must note that our findings show a correlation only. Our data set in-
volves a broad group of the largest firms, but it covers the years after the 2008
financial crisis. After the crisis, several overlapping phenomena advanced a shift
toward greater women's leadership. Studies revealed that some of the trading
that took place pre-crisis resulted from excessively risky behavior engaged in by
men. A variety of studies suggested a male propensity to engage in risk and
female aversion to risk. Whether or not sex relates to risky decision-making, a
broad swath of the market, including many management consultancies, spread
this perception.
This phenomenon, simultaneous to the increased inclusion of women on
boards, could partly explain the broader phenomenon of inclusion. Set against
this broader context, we show that turnover intensifies diversity effects out in
the marketplace by speeding up the frequency of board departure and entry.
We cannot claim that heightened turnover would definitely have the same effect
in every context, but in the current context of increased inclusion in response
to the financial-crisis period, it does.
This Part has examined the relationship between tenure, turnover and
board refreshment, and sex diversity. Board refreshment-under the current
pressure from investors for better sex diversity--can improve sex diversity, and
on its face, term limits may provide one route through which refreshment could
be advanced. The next Part discusses these policy implications.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our findings suggest that policy-whether legislated or voluntary-should
encourage reduced tenure to speed the integration of corporate leadership.
Other jurisdictions have adopted hard or soft mandates for term limits. The
United States, often reluctant to adopt state-driven solutions, may focus instead
on private-sector efforts. Here, a variety of actors-from legislatures to activist
investors-may consider efforts to foster board turnover. With our research,
they may find more traction for term limits as a means to ensure good govern-
ance or as a channel to increase diversity on boards.183
This Part explores the potential remedies available, starting with a summary
of other countries' efforts, followed by a schematic assessment of the potential
182. See generally Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 10. This article includes data from over two
dozen interviews with current and former corporate board members from CAC-40 firms.
183. Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substanive Gender Diversity in Boardwoms, 94 IND. L.J. 145, 147-50
(2019).
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remedies and a cost-benefit examination of the impact of these potential
changes.
A. Countries with Term Lamits
While some U.S. companies have adopted term limits for themselves, as a
federal matter, neither the United States nor Canada mandates term limits. Yet
"many other countries have either introduced limits on the length of time di-
rectors can serve or have added extra disclosure requirements to ensure com-
panies have to explain why long-serving board members remain
independent." 84 The United Kingdom, for instance, imposes a nine-year limit
on independent board members, after which directors constitute nonindepend-
ent members.'85 At the nine-year mark, a director must leave or become an
insider; otherwise, the board must demonstrate why that individual's tenure has
not undermined independence.' 86 This route permits boards to continue to ben-
efit from experience while addressing the concerns of a decrease in the direc-
tor's independence. France has a similar requirement, mandating that directors
lose their independent status after twelve years and thus not perform tasks that
require independence, such as serving on the audit committee. 8 7
On the other hand, such limitations can interfere with the board's business
judgment and leave these experienced people with fewer tasks.1 88 The critics of
the United Kingdom's term limits assert that the average tenure of the board,
rather than the tenure of individual members, should be considered, bringing
U.K. boards into line with the advocates for tenure diversity. 89 A focus on the
tenure of the board as a whole would allow firms flexibility to keep certain
board members longer, as long as the overall tenure meets certain require-
ments.1 90
184. McFarland, supra note 40; see also Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54 (discussing comply-or-explain
policies in firms).
185. Dou, Sahgal & Zhang, supra note 25, at 1. Six-year term limits have allowed the United Kingdom
to gain more gender diversity on boards than the United States. Diane Brady, To Get Women on Company Boards,
Make Men Leave, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 20, 2012, 5:06 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2012-09-20/to-get-women-on-company-boards-make-men-leave#pl.
186. Pozen, supra note 25. This rule only applies to companies that are publicly traded. Id.
187. McFarland, smpra note 40.
188. See Pozen, supra note 25 (explaining how experienced board members add value to firms, as they
are more likely to attend board meetings, become members of committees, and counterbalance chief execu-
tive authority); see also Vafeas, supra note 49, at 1044 (suggesting that term limits lead to wasting experienced
directors' talent and experience).
189. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54. Na Li and Aida Sijamic Wahid also note that "implementing
term limits may result in better govemance outcomes if [the limits] alter[] the mix of director tenure lengths."
Li & Wahid, supra note 26.
190. For example, the legitimacy of this policy draws on a broad sentiment against long board service
in the United Kingdom, as two terms of three years is a typical board-membership duration. Sarah Frier,
J&J'sMulcahy Says Term Limits MayAdd Women to Boards, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-14/j-j-s-mulcahy-says-term-liiits-may-add-women-to-
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Other countries avoid such rigid term limits but suggest limiting a director's
independence after a number of years. For example, Hong Kong requires a
special board-wide resolution after a nine-year term-a hurdle companies tend
to avoid.191 Spain recommends a twelve-year limit on independence.1 92 South
Africa and Singapore both recommend a "rigorous review" of directors who
serve more than nine years.1 93 Additionally, Singapore requires that boards ex-
plain why the directors would be considered independent after nine years.1 94
Norway suggests that boards reconsider a director's independence when the
member "has served for a prolonged continuous period." 9 5
Canada does not limit terms for board members. While federal provincial
law limits the duration of individual terms to three years, no mandate exists
regarding either an age or accumulation restriction.1 96 The Canadian Securities
Administrators-a collection of regulators from every province-have adopted
a comply-or-explain policy for firms regarding the mechanism that they put into
place for board renewal, including term limits.1 97 Boards thus have to disclose
the reasons for their noncompliance.
To that extent, some voluntary regulation of term limits occurs. Blakes, a
leading Canadian corporate law firm, conducted an examination of 722 firms
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.' 98 "Only 19[/o] disclosed that they have
adopted director term limits and 56[%] disclosed that they have adopted a
mechanism for board renewal other than director term limits. The most com-
monly disclosed mechanism for board renewal involved board assessments."'99
boards.html (quoting an interview of Helena Morrissey, CEO of Newton Investment Management, in Lon-
don).
191. Id.; see also WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SELECTED
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES AND CODES OF BEST PRACTICE: UNITED STATES, UNITED
KINGDOM, FRANCE, GERMANY, OECD, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL,
CHINA, HONG KONG, INDIA, RUSSIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 116 (2014).
192. McFarland, supra note 40.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id; WELIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 191, at 115.
196. See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44; see also Business Corporations Act,
R.S.Q., c S-31.1, art 110 (Can. Que).
197. See ONT. SEC. COMM'N, NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 58-101: DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, art. 10 (2016). The Canadian Securities Administrators has put into place an ob-
ligation to disclose the adoption of term limits for directors. Id. Article Ten of the NI 58-101 mandates that
companies disclose:
whether or not the issuer has adopted term limits for the directors on its board or other mecha-
nisms of board renewal and, if so, include a description of those director term limits or other
mechanisms of board renewal. If the issuer has not adopted director term limits or other mecha-
nisms of board renewal, disclose why it has not done so.
Id
198. See John Tuzyk & Stefania Zilinskas, Director Term Limits Not Common, BLAKES (Oct. 9, 2015),
https://www.blakesbusinessclass.com/director-term-linmits-not-common/.
199. Id. ("Of the 137 issuers in the Sample Group that disclosed they have director term limits, just
over half of that group disclosed they have director age limits in place. Twenty-four [percent] of that group
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Larger firms, with a market capitalization of $2 billion, were more likely to have
limits, while smaller issuers had other mechanisms for board renewal.200
This range of legislation abroad grounds-but does not delimit-our un-
derstanding of available remedies, whether by legislative and private sector ac-
ton.
B. Polip Options to Foster Turnover
Below, we present several potential policy paths. This Article presents data
that may provide direction for policy. Rather than advocate for term limits, we
seek to underscore the policy options which vary significantly in their scope and
structure. We organize them from nonbinding and informal rules to those that
impose mandates on firms, industries, or jurisdictions.
Expanding on the various options that firms and countries have adopted,201
in Figure 4 we suggest a range of possible remedies that extend from the more
flexible, privately chosen policies to the more fixed, state-regulated policies.
Given the widespread reticence in the corporate sector to impose regulatory
mandates, Figure 4202 presents the variety of remedies possible: at the top ap-
pear remedies within firms, 203 followed by industry-wide remedies, 204 and at the
bottom sit collective, regulatory measures. Each section contains a range of
remedies that reveal more subtle variations.205 Some remedies on this chart cur-
rently exist within corporations or regulations, while we have suggested others
based on current diversity remedies.
disclosed they have director tenure limits in place and the remaining 231%] have both director term and age
limits in place.").
200. Id.
201. See infra Part I.C; Veltrop et al., supra note 40, at 446 (discussing how European and non-Euro-
pean regulators and firms in the United States "advocate to limit outside director tenure"); McFarland, supra
note 40 (discussing how "[c]ountries around the world have introduced governance guidelines urging com-
panies to adopt term limits for their boards").
202. The structure of the chart draws on one by Jane Mansbridge in the context of political quotas for
women. Jane Mansbridge, The Descritive Political Representation of GenderAnAnti-EssentiastArgument, in HAS
LIBERALiSM FAILED WOMEN?: ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
19,31 (Jytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 2001).
203. For example, remedies that General Electric uses to reduce tenure include a term limit, retire-
ment-age requirements, and annual board evaluations. Hoang, supra note 175. Target similarly imposes both
a term limit and an age requirement. TARGET, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 7 (2019),
https://investors.target.com/static-files/59b21ff6-d8a3-43b2-94a7-79d61el 9bf05.
204. Companies within the same industry can pressure each other to adopt similar arrangements due
to competition between firms and to data networks. See Michael Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and
Corporate Governance, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 669, 671-72 (2014) [hereinafter Board Interlocks]; Michal Barzuza &
Quinn Curtis, Interlocking Board Seats and Protectionfor DirectorsAfterSchoon, 8 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 2013-11, 2013), [http://perma.cc/R9S8-8GFE] [hereinafter Interlocking Board Seats].
205. See general Nil, supra note 183.
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Figure 4. Term-Limit Remedies
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At the top level appear voluntary remedies that firms can adopt themselves,
including voluntary reporting and disclosure rules; requiring an overall, aver-
aged tenure limit; limiting service on certain committees after a certain period;
limiting board members' independent status; and having strict tenure limits on
all individuals. 206
The middle level, somewhat more rigid than an individual firm's decision,
would be industry-wide regulation, which could suggest or even mandate rules
on tenure with regard to the different elements of tenure that regulation could
encompass (average limit, committee service, independence, and blanket limits).
206. See Hoang, supra note 175; see also Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54 (describing term limits, limits
of service on audit and compensation comnittees after a certain length of time, and mandatory director
retirement ages as measures firms take to address tenure concerns).
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This industry-wide "self-regulating" could be the product of proxy advisor de-
mandS207 or the development of industry best-practice guides, which often arise
from competition among firms. 208
Finally, at the bottom appear regulatory options. Any regulatory actor-
local, state, or federal legislatures, as well as the judiciary-may choose to adopt
these policies. Regulatory requirements can also vary from softer to harder
rules.209 As with any remedy, even within firms, we need to account for the
potential that particular boards may try to game their way out of enforcement
of any particular provision. This proves more likely with state-imposed reme-
dies than with remedies firms themselves adopt.
C Firm Remedies
We may wonder why firms adopt term limits. Shareholder pressure may
drive the effort, while others have boards interested in improving their govern-
ance. Based on the small sample of firms that have already adopted term limits,
it seems that firms forced to do so did not necessarily benefit-notably GE.
Firms whose boards chose term limits may experience greater benefits. This
makes sense because the board has already expressed the will to refresh in
adopting the limit, so implementation involves voluntary follow-through rather
than shareholder-induced arm-twisting. If combined with other good govern-
ance efforts, term limits may prove still more effective. The number of firms
with term limits grows-it has grown from nineteen to twenty-five from 2017
to 2018-providing an opportunity for future qualitative research. 210
Some firms-those without term-limit policies-have a general practice of
keeping tenure relatively low, and this may be part of a broader good govern-
ance practice. 211 Our data confirms this reality, since enough firms have lower
207. Remedies within firms could include utilizing "shareholder [proxies] as an effective tool for cor-
porate governance changes." Nil, supra note 183, at 197. Corporations have paid closer attention to non-
binding shareholder proposals due to the increasing importance of proxy advisors and the threat of withhold
campaigns against companies that ignore shareholder concerns. Id. at 197-98. Shareholders can submit di-
versity disclosure proposals to companies, which would be a "modest request ... that falls within the core
rights of shareholders." Id. at 198. "[Requiring [these] disclosure[s would] produce ... changes as companies
attempt to appease shareholders." Id
208. See Board Interlocks, supra note 204, at 700.
209. For example, the United States has taken a softer approach, requiring companies to disclose only
whether they have a diversity policy and a description of the policy. DHIR, supra note 97, at 82-83. European
countries have taken a harder approach, some adopting quota legislation. See Clark, supra note 13.
210. Compare Ning Chiu, Board Composition at the S&P 500 Companies, DAVIS POLK (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.briefinggovernance.com/2016/12/board-composition-at-the-sp-500-companies/, aith Ning
Chiu, Benchmarking Against the Spencer Stuart S&P 500 Board Practices Report, DAVIS POLK (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.briefinggovernance.com/2018/11 /benchmarking-against-the-spencer-stuart-sp-500-board-
practices-report/.
211. Walmart hired a third-party consulting firm to help with its "Board Refreshment and Succession
Planning." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra note 171, at 29. The board's lead independent director James I. Cash
Jr. spoke on behalf of the company saying, "We believe that board refreshment and succession planning are
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tenure to drive the inclusion of women.212 Some of the firms that adopt term
limits may be aware of the costs of overly long tenures. For that reason, at least
some term-limit firms may show weaker numbers with regard to the subject of
our study: high tenure and low diversity.213 The long delay for implementation
of term limits-combined with the fact that term-limit firms may initially have
weaker numbers-may explain how firms without term limits boast better di-
versity numbers. 214 We expect this would prove a near-term phenomenon as
term limits kick in.
Firms vary widely in how they adopt term limits. It may be a simple report-
ing requirement in which they shift their tenure statistics. 215 While this data is
no secret, aggregating and reporting it draws attention to the issue without ob-
ligating the firm to act on the data.
Limits on overall tenure would be the next step. Such a policy would require
a firm to have an average tenure ceiling-presumably sufficiently low to ensure
substantive refreshment of boards. This would permit nominating committees
to determine which board members should be encouraged to leave and which
may stay.216 This softer measure would not force firms to send a uniquely skilled
expert board member away but rather would allow firms to make a choice-if
some members stay longer, others will have to leave sooner in order to maintain
the cumulative tenure below the limit.217
Committee-service limitations provide another possible remedy. Certain
committees play a central role in the management of the firm. While boards
may have various committees, several key committees mandated for all publicly
critical and demonstrate good corporate governance practices." WalmartPositionsBoard ofDirectorsfor the Future,
supra note 173.
212. Average director tenure on S&P 500 boards is 8.2 years, having decreased from 5 years ago. 2017
BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 18. The median tenure has also declined from 8.4 years to 8 years. Id Sixty-
two percent of boards have an average independent director tenure range of 6 to 10 years. Id.
213. See supra Part III.
214. Alaska Air has implemented a fifteen-year term limit that will affect directors after 2012, meaning
that the term limits would not be imposed until 2027. ALASKA AIR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDENFS,
supra note 168, at 4. Despite this, diversity has remained high, perhaps due to the consistent inclusion in every
proxy statement since 2004 of the comment that diversity factors into nominating board members. See id. at
3.
215. Firms could adopt a "Substantive Gender Diversity Disclosure" (SGDD) that "would require
them to provide a clear table, similar to other disclosures such as director and executive compensation" that
highlights measures such as the "ratio of women to men on the board" and "comparative breakdown of age
and tenure." Nili, supra note 183, at 196.
216. Li & Wahid, supra note 26 (noting that "implementing term limits may result in better governance
outcomes if [the limits] altern the mix of director tenure lengths").
217. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54 (suggesting that overall tenure considerations are "a more
meaningful metric for evaluating board refreshment" than a focus only on long-tenured directors).
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traded companies hold an outsized influence in governance. 218 These key com-
mittees are the audit committee,219 the nominating and corporate governance
committee, 220 and the compensation committee. 221 Research shows that direc-
tors have a stronger, more direct impact on executive compensation, new di-
rector selection, and other important board actions if they serve on board
committees that hold primary responsibility for these functions.222 Some term-
limit arrangements prevent long-standing board members from specific com-
mittee assignments. 223 Such limitations require the core governance of the firm
reflect the board's fresher perspectives. 224 A similar issue surfaces with inde-
pendence. Jurisdictions often limit the years of board service to qualify as inde-
pendent.225 Where states do not regulate this, firms may decide to implement
such policies as an internal matter.
Each of the internal term limits discussed above would prove less onerous
for firms than adopting an individual term-limit restriction, which would apply
to each board member. The lower imposition of softer term-limit arrangements
may induce more firms to adopt them. Instituting a maximum period for each
member constitutes the most stringent internal requirement. In this regard-as
an alternative to term limits or in conjunction with term limits-mandatory re-
tirement rules may have a similar effect by forcing senior members from con-
tinued service.226 Counterintuitively, more stringent term limits involve
218. Nili, supra note 183, at 154; see also David A. Carter et al., The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US
Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 396, 400 (2010); Idalene F.
Kesner, Directors' Characteristics and Committee Membershp: An Investigation of Tpe, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender,
31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66, 67 (1988); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON.
275, 277 (1998); 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 7, at 29-31.
219. The audit committee is charged with ensuring the quality and integrity of the company's financial
statements and regulatory compliance. N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 5 303A.07, http://nysemanual.
nyse.com/lcm/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). Under NYSE listing rules, the committee must be comprised
solely of independent directors. Id.
220. The nominating committee is in charge of nominating director candidates and often also selects
new CEOs and peer directors to the other board committees. See Joseph V. Carcello et al., CEO Involvement
in Selecting Board Members, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Restatements, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 396, 397
(2011).
221. The compensation committee is tasked with setting the compensation of senior executives and
generally oversees the corporation's compensation policies. See N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra
note 219, 5 303A.05. Under NYSE listing rules, the committee must be comprised solely of independent
directors. See id.
222. See Klein, supra note 218, at 277-81.
223. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54 (discussing how term limits may be an "avenue to address
concerns over director independence," as independence is crucial for board committees such as audit and
compensation committees).
224. Firms can achieve improved governance by diversifying new perspectives on the board. See Lynne
L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Board of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1391 (2002)
(explaining that diversity generates "conflicting opinions, knowledge, and perspectives that result in ... more
thorough ... interpretations, alternatives, and consequences"); see also Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note
10, at 889.
225. See Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54.
226. Several firms impose age limits on directors, such as General Electric, whose retirement policy
indicates that directors retire when they are.seventy-five years old. 2016 GE Proxy Statement, supra note 174,
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potential lag time for implementation. 227 A firm that adopts a term limit of fif-
teen years this year, but grandfathers current board members, will not impose
the limit until 2034. By contrast, firms may impose the other softer require-
ments sooner with less disruption.
Last, firms can harden or soften their policies through either short limits
on widespread grandfather clauses-to make term limits more binding-or
opt-outs to keep exceptionally important board members. 228 With these policy
alterations, the board can explain to shareholders why they have not asked a
term-limited member to leave. Such opt-out provisions also serve to soften re-
quirements and mute the risk of losing an individual who proves essential to a
firm's governance. These exceptions allow firms to avoid this consequence in
exceptional circumstances.
D. Industry-Wide Remedies
As they do with some corporate social responsibility matters, 229 industry
organizations could set norms to encourage firms to self-regulate. Similarly,
proxy advisors and institutional investors might direct their attention to specific
industries, requiring enhanced arrangements in industries that tend to lack re-
freshment. Finally, when a firm within an industry adopts specific limits, similar
companies may follow suit thanks to the natural competition between firms and
data networks.230 Industries sometimes adopt rules deliberately to avoid state
regulation. Even non-binding self-regulations push behavior toward a broader
norm.
at 2. Similarly, Walmart has a policy where directors are not eligible for reelection after age seventy-five. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., supra note 171, at 30. Mastercard's term limit applies to directors after their fifteenth year
or after their seventy-second birthday. MASTERCARD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES, supra note
156, at 6; see also Mastercard Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 9 (Apr. 29, 2016).
227. For example, Alaska Air's term limit only applies to directors elected after 2012, which means
that the term would only affect directors after 2027 at the earliest. ALASKA AIR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 168, at 4.
228. See MASTERCARD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 156, at 6. Mastercard has
a term limit of fifteen years; however, the board can determine that "due to unique or extenuating circum-
stances it is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders to extend the director's service for an
additional period of time." Id.
229. See Christopher P. Skroupa, CSR-The Approach From The Inside-Out, SKYTOP STRATEGIES (Jan.
31, 2018), https://skytopstrategies.com/csr-approach-inside/ (explaining that "[c]reating and nurturing a
strong internal culture is a vital component in successfully delivering on a commitment to corporate respon-
sibility" and how employee engagement committees have been established around the world to coordinate
philanthropic activities throughout the year).
230. See Board Interlocks, supra note 204, at 672-73.
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E. Regulation of Term Limits
As with firm regulation and industry regulation, states, federal regulators,
and stock exchanges can adopt softer or firmer requirements. Borrowing from
some of the remedies adopted to mandate sex diversity on corporate boards,
regulators can impose reporting requirements.231 While publicly available tenure
data requires calculation to ascertain the average tenure of a board and each
director's tenure, stronger reporting requirements would shed more light on
how firms perform. On its own, a reporting requirement could valorize refresh-
ment.
Above a reporting requirement sits a "comply-or-explain" provision.232
Ontario has such a requirement with regard to sex diversity on corporate
boards.233 Regulators could establish an average tenure requirement: firms
would have to meet those terms or explain their noncompliance. In several ju-
risdictions that have adopted these remedies, firms thoroughly comply. 234 The
pressure of media attention motivates firms to step up and comply, even though
the penalty is merely confessional.235
Regulators can also limit overall average tenure of the board. The advantage
of such remedies for firms, as discussed above, is that it provides them flexibil-
ity with regard to any particular director as long as their overall numbers meet
the mandated target. Deciding the specific threshold might prove challenging,
however, and would suffer from one-size-fits-all concerns.
As at the firm level, regulations for committee service and independence
could provide a softer target. Regulators can mandate refreshment in the most
central parts of a firm's governance without imposing absolute mandates and
without interfering in the structure of the board.
Legislative mandates of rebuttable limits on individual tenure provide the
next level of mandate. Here, depending on how onerous firms view the expo-
sure, they may comply in their entirety, or they may view the requirement as a
purely hortatory one.236 The experience with voluntary quotas for board sex
231. Some regulators "have placed hard quotas on board composition, requiring either progressive
representation by board size or ... requiring some minimum number of female directors." Nili, supra note
183, at 193; see also DHIR, supra note 97, at 71-94.
232. See DHIR, supra note 97, at 240-48; Katz & McIntosh, supra note 54.
233. Gender Dierrity On Boards In Canada: Recommendadions ForAccelerating Progress, CATALYST (June 7,
2016), http://www.catalyst.org/gender-diversity-boards-canada-recommendations-accelerating-progress.
234. See DIR, supra note 97, at 71-94.
235. See id.
236. Id. Spain's law is softer-although it obliges an increase in board participation to 40%, there are
no formal sanctions for failure. U.K. DEP'T FOR Bus. INNOVATION & SKILLS, WOMEN ON BOARDS 22
(2011). Spain's 2007 quota requires "public companies and IBEX 35-quoted firms with more than 250 em-
ployees to attain a minimum 40% share of each sex on their boards" by 2015, but "there are no formal
sanctions" for companies that do not reach this quota. Id.
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diversity reflects that compliance in these circumstances becomes a question
not only of law but also of culture. 237
The risk of this latter response-that firms may rebut the requirements-
may provide motivation for clearer limits on all individuals' tenure. 238 This
would prove far more onerous than average limits because it would require the
departure of some especially expert senior board members. 239 Resistance to
these regulatory changes may lead firms to come up with regulatory arbitrage
strategies centering around term limits. The risk of such arbitrage may favor
state mandates that only impose average tenure requirements.
As with other remedies, sunset provisions, which delineate a specific dura-
tion for a particular rule, may prove useful to encourage compliance while re-
assuring market actors that ineffective regulations will not continue forever.
This project's purpose is to assess the relationship between tenure and sex
diversity. The general correlation between tenure and diversity prompts us to
mention another idea-term limits only on men. Such a term limit would func-
tion more like a quota for sex equality rather than a term limit.240 While this may
prove fruitful as a regulatory mechanism, it cuts against the foundational moti-
vating idea of this study: whether a nonidentitarian, nonclassification remedy
could promote diversity.
CONCLUSION
This Article charts a new course for diversity remedies. Instead of fixing
sex diversity ratios for all boards, increasing the supply of board positions could
better foster sex diversity. Higher turnover on boards, as we demonstrate, links
to an improvement in board sex diversity.
Sex diversity realizes both social equality and good firm governance. While
this goal garners near-universal assent, discord surfaces over how to achieve in-
clusion. Since Twitter's 2014 IPO, #MeToo shook the country, and California
passed a quota. Despite this marked spike in attention to sex diversity on cor-
porate boards, the United States falls short, especially in contrast to other de-
veloped nations.
How, then, should policy makers and investors improve board turnover?
We explored the relatively seldom-used corporate governance mechanism of
term limits.
237. See Diversity and Women on Boards, supra note 99.
238. See Nili, supra note 183, at 189.
239. It is argued that experienced directors add value in that long tenure "help[s] directors counter-
balance chief executive authority." Pozen, supra note 25; see also Li & Wahid, supra note 26. Additionally, it is
argued that long-term directors have a higher level of commitment to the company. Director Term Limits Come
Up for Retiew, supra note 52, at 19.
240. Murray, supra note 36, at 520 (explaining how quotas for men, addressing the issue of male
overrepresentation, would raise the quality of representation for all).
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We argue that the combination of effective and carefully designed term
limits, with the increased attention to sex diversity, could lead to a more organic
route to improving diversity on boards--one that sidesteps the complex ques-
tions embedded with a more direct and aggressive approach. Equally important,
term limits hold the potential to realize still broader diversity, including with
regard to race. In jurisdictions with seemingly intractable political divisions,
consensus remedies for inclusion could point the way forward for public policy.
